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ABSTRACT—Originalists have traditionally based the normative case for 
originalism primarily on principles of popular sovereignty: the Constitution 
owes its legitimacy as higher law to the fact that it was ratified by the 
American people through a supermajoritarian process. As such, it must be 
interpreted according to the original meaning that it had at the time of 
ratification. To give it another meaning today is to allow judges to enforce 
a legal rule that was never actually embraced and enacted by the people. 
Whatever the merits of this argument in general, it faces particular hurdles 
when applied to the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment 
was a purely partisan measure, drafted and enacted entirely by Republicans 
in a rump Reconstruction Congress in which the Southern states were 
denied representation; it would never have made it through Congress had 
all of the elected Senators and Representatives been permitted to vote. And 
it was ratified not by the collective assent of the American people, but 
rather at gunpoint. The Southern states had been placed under military rule, 
and were forced to ratify the Amendment—which they despised—as a 
condition of ending military occupation and rejoining the Union. The 
Amendment can therefore claim no warrant to democratic legitimacy 
through original popular sovereignty. It was added to the Constitution 
despite its open failure to obtain the support of the necessary supermajority 
of the American people. This Article explores the fundamental challenge 
that this history poses to originalism. 
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Originalists have traditionally based the normative case for 
originalism1 primarily on principles of popular sovereignty: the 
Constitution owes its legitimacy as higher law to the fact that it was ratified 
by the American people through a supermajoritarian process. As such, it 
must be interpreted according to the original meaning that it had at the time 
of ratification. To give it another meaning today is to allow judges to 
enforce a legal rule that was never actually embraced and enacted by the 
people. And there is no warrant in a democratic nation for unelected judges 
to strike down popularly enacted statutes unless those statutes violate 
higher laws by which the people collectively agreed to be bound.2 
 
1 Many constitutional theories lay claim to the label of “originalism.” See Thomas B. Colby & 
Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 247–62 (2009). What those theories generally 
have in common is that they treat “the discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial 
adoption as authoritative for purposes of constitutional interpretation in the present.” Keith E. 
Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 (2004). Lawrence Solum 
elaborates: 
All or almost all originalists agree that the original meaning of the Constitution was fixed at the 
time each provision was framed and ratified. Almost all originalists agree that original meaning 
must make an important contribution to the content of constitutional doctrine: Most originalists 
agree that courts should view themselves as constrained by original meaning and that very good 
reasons are required for legitimate departures from that constraint. 
Lawrence B. Solum, What is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory, in THE 
CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12, 36 (Grant Huscroft 
& Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011). 
2 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1127, 1136 (1998) (“When a judge goes beyond the meaning of the words that were enacted—
to . . . what the courts think would meet the needs and goals of society—the judge has no democratic 
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Whatever the merits of this argument in general, it faces particular 
hurdles when applied to the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth 
Amendment was a purely partisan measure, drafted and enacted entirely by 
Republicans in a rump Reconstruction Congress in which the Southern 
states were denied representation; it would never have made it through 
Congress had all of the elected Senators and Representatives been 
permitted to vote. And it was ratified not by the collective assent of the 
American people, but rather at gunpoint. The Southern states had been 
placed under military rule, and were forced to ratify the Amendment—
which they despised with an (un)holy hatred—as a condition of ending 
military occupation and rejoining the Union.3 The Amendment may have 
enjoyed military legitimacy—might makes right, and the victor on the 
battlefield can dictate the terms of the peace.4 And it surely enjoyed moral 
legitimacy—right is right, and the evil of racism flies in the face of 
freedom and justice.5 But it can claim no warrant to democratic legitimacy 
through original popular sovereignty. It was added to the Constitution 
despite its open failure to obtain the support of the necessary supermajority 
of the American people. 
This Article explores the fundamental challenge that this history poses 
to originalism—a challenge that originalists have ignored.6 The point of 
this Article is not to question whether, as a formalist matter, the Fourteenth 
Amendment was properly promulgated and ratified. Despite some vigorous 
 
warrant.”); Lee J. Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical Traditions Within 
Constitutional Interpretation: Originalism Grounded in the Central Western Philosophical Tradition, 
28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 909, 972 (2005) (“[W]hat warrant did the judiciary have in overruling the 
legislature and executive if not done pursuant to the People’s prior authoritative act which was 
embodied in a determinate text?”). 
3 See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (requiring the Southern states to establish new 
governments under new state constitutions, grant the right to vote to African Americans, and ratify the 
Fourteenth Amendment before being readmitted to the Union). 
4 See Albert J. Esgain, The Position of the United States and the Soviet Union on Treaty Law and 
Treaty Negotiations, 46 MIL. L. REV. 31, 32 n.3 (1969) (noting that historically, “international law 
disregarded the effect of coercion in the conclusion of peace treaties” (citing 1 L. OPPENHEIM, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 891–92 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955))). 
5 See Mark S. Stein, Originalism and Original Exclusions, 98 KY. L.J. 397, 422 (2010). 
6 Some scholars have made a very broad charge that originalists have all but ignored the Fourteenth 
Amendment altogether. See Barry Friedman, Reconstructing Reconstruction: Some Problems for 
Originalists (and Everyone Else, Too), 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1201, 1207 (2009) (arguing that, for 
originalists, the Fourteenth Amendment “remain[s] a bit of a frontier, relatively unexplored and little 
understood”); id. at 1209 (arguing that “originalists—with a few notable exceptions . . .—have devoted 
little if any attention to the Second Founding”); Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 
71 MD. L. REV. 978, 979 (2012) (“The Fourteenth Amendment is the Mr. Cellophane of originalist 
writing. Judges, scholars, and ordinary citizens writing or speaking in the originalist tradition 
consistently ignore the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”). The argument here 
is different—that, even when they do write about the Fourteenth Amendment, originalists have ignored 
its uniquely weak claim to legitimacy through popular sovereignty. 
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objections in the past,7 that question has been put to rest by the judgment of 
history, if nothing else.8 And the point is certainly not to suggest that judges 
err today in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment judicially. From a 
nonoriginalist perspective, the Amendment’s dubious origins have little 
bearing on its modern authority, given its moral force and the near-
universal support and acceptance that it currently enjoys.9 My object is 
instead to question whether the Amendment’s shady origins undermine the 
argument that judges should interpret it according to its original meaning. 
I also mean to suggest the possibility that the shortcomings in the 
framing of the Fourteenth Amendment could seriously undermine the 
normative appeal of originalism more generally. Some originalists have 
conceded that, as a result of both incorporation and the increased emphasis 
on substantive due process and equal protection, the “great bulk of 
constitutional law involves state, not federal law and nearly all such rulings 
purport to be based on the Fourteenth Amendment. For all practical judicial 
purposes, the Fourteenth Amendment has virtually become the 
Constitution.”10 This may overstate the point, but it is certainly the case that 
the Fourteenth Amendment has assumed center stage in a great many of the 
 
7 See, e.g., Joseph L. Call, The Fourteenth Amendment and Its Skeptical Background, 13 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 1 (1961); Pinckney G. McElwee, The 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
and the Threat that It Poses to Our Democratic Government, 11 S.C. L.Q. 484 (1959); Walter J. 
Suthon, Jr., The Dubious Origin of the Fourteenth Amendment, 28 TUL. L. REV. 22 (1953); State 
Sovereignty Comm’n of La., Unconstitutional Creation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 23 GA. B.J. 228 
(1960); Editorial, If, WORLD (N.Y.), July 23, 1868, at 4. 
8 The definitive treatment of this question is a masterful article by John Harrison. See John 
Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 375 (2001). The most 
compelling argument expressing skepticism on the question, at least as a formalist matter, comes from 
Bruce Ackerman. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 99–100, 115–16 
(1998). 
9 For instance, in 1994, 87% of Americans approved of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Joseph Carroll, Race and Education 50 Years After 
Brown v. Board of Education, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE (May 14, 2004), http://www.gallup.com/poll/
11686/race-education-years-after-brown-board-education.aspx. 
10 Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Interpretation, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 631, 632 (1993) (footnote 
omitted); see also, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 3 (2d ed. 1997) (“The Fourteenth Amendment is the case study par 
excellence of what Justice Harlan described as the Supreme Court’s ‘exercise of the amending power,’ 
its continuing revision of the Constitution under the guise of interpretation. Because the Amendment is 
probably the largest source of the Court’s business and furnishes the chief fulcrum for its control of 
controversial policies, the question whether such control is authorized by the Constitution is of great 
practical importance.” (footnotes omitted)). As for incorporated rights, “[m]uch recent scholarship has 
suggested that originalist analyses of Bill of Rights provisions applied to the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment should consider the original understanding as of 1868 in addition [or as opposed] to that of 
1791.” Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? From 
the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 464 (2012); see also Josh Blackman, Response, 
Originalism at the Right Time?, 90 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 269, 276 (2012) (arguing that, as a matter of 
proper originalist theory, incorporated rights should be interpreted according to their public meaning “in 
1868 rather than 1791”). 
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most controversial debates in constitutional law. As such, if the normative 
arguments in favor of originalism do not hold water when applied to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, then, as a practical matter, the normative appeal of 
originalism is severely diminished. 
Part I of this Article sets out the traditional normative defense of 
originalism as grounded in notions of popular sovereignty, and also 
recounts related defenses of originalism that sound in contract theory and in 
the pragmatic superiority of supermajoritarian decisionmaking. Part II then 
documents the very different reality of the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which was enacted without the assent of the American 
people. Finally, Part III explores the implications for originalism of this 
disconnect between theory and reality, and evaluates possible originalist 
responses. 
I. PUBLIC CONSENSUS AND NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR 
ORIGINALISM 
Most originalists defend their constitutional theory on normative 
grounds.11 And the most common and most influential normative defenses 
of originalism—those sounding in popular sovereignty, contract, and 
utilitarianism—all share a common fundamental premise: that the 
Constitution was adopted by the collective will of a supermajority of the 
American people. 
A. Popular Sovereignty 
As prominent originalist Kurt Lash has noted, “the most common and 
most influential justification for originalism [is] popular sovereignty and 
the judicially enforced will of the people.”12 
The argument typically unfolds something like this. The Declaration 
of Independence establishes that the American people are the locus of all 
sovereignty: “Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed.”13 As the Preamble to the 
 
11 To be sure, not all originalists do so. Of late, there has been an increasing tendency among 
academic originalists to treat originalism as a purely interpretive, rather than normative, theory. This 
development is discussed in Part III.B.3, infra. 
12 Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 
1437, 1440 (2007); see also KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 111 (1999) (“Traditional defenses of originalism 
often employ some version of a popular sovereignty argument.”); Lash, supra (noting that “originalist 
jurists generally” defend originalism in popular sovereignty terms); Earl Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal 
of Originalism, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 773, 776 (noting that “the appeal to democratic theory” is 
“probably the most popular defense of originalism”); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 128 
(Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Papers Series No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1120244 (“The most common justification for originalism is rooted in the ideas of popular 
sovereignty and democratic legitimacy.”). 
13 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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Constitution makes clear, it was “We the People” who created the 
Constitution—who chose by ratifying that document to vest some of our 
sovereignty in the federal government, subject to the various limitations 
and reservations spelled out in the Constitution.14 The Constitution was a 
sovereign act of the American people (or, perhaps more precisely, the 
people of the various American states15); it owes its status as law to the fact 
that the people collectively assented to it through the ratification process.16 
And it owes its status as higher law—capable of trumping ordinary laws—
to the fact that, in enacting it, a supermajority of the American people 
chose—through an extraordinary, more deeply democratic process—to 
bind future, ordinary, representative, majoritarian lawmaking within its 
confines.17 That is to say, it owes its status as higher law to the fact that it 
represents the collective will of the people themselves, rather than the will 
of a majority of the people’s elected agents.18 The people can, of course, 
 
14 See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect 
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the 
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and 
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (“That the people have an original right to establish, for their future 
government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, 
on which the whole American fabric has been erected. . . . The principles, therefore, so established, are 
deemed fundamental. And . . . the authority, from which they proceed, is supreme . . . .”); William H. 
Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 696 (1976) (“The people are the 
ultimate source of authority; they have parceled out the authority that originally resided entirely with 
them by adopting the original Constitution and by later amending it.”). 
15 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 254 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“[T]he 
Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America . . . not as 
individuals composing one entire nation; but as composing the distinct and independent States to which 
they respectively belong.”). 
16 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 150 (“The Constitution gained its initial authority 
from the consent of those who would be governed by it through the mechanism of ratification.”); Edwin 
Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 455, 465 (1986) (“The Constitution represents the consent of the governed to the structures and 
powers of the government. The Constitution is the fundamental will of the people; that is the reason the 
Constitution is the fundamental law. To allow the court[] to govern simply by what it views at the time 
as fair and decent, is a scheme of government no longer popular; the idea of democracy has suffered.”). 
17 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 7, 17–18 (2005) 
(emphasizing the supermajoritarian nature of the ratification process); Lash, supra note 12, at 1444 
(“As the product of a more deeply democratic process, constitutional rules have earned the right to be 
treated as the will of the people and accordingly trump those laws passed through the ordinary political 
process.”). 
18 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 15, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (“If there should 
happen to be an irreconcileable variance between [a statute and a constitution], that which has the 
superior obligation and validity ought of course to be preferred; or in other words, the constitution 
ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.”); id. 
(declaring that “where the will of the legislature declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of 
the people declared in the constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter, rather than the 
former”); Stein, supra note 5, at 409 (noting but not endorsing the originalist arguments that the 
“Constitution, it is said, was the work of the People, while contemporary statutes are merely the work of 
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change the Constitution by employing the similarly supermajoritarian 
amendment procedures of Article V; when that happens, it is the newly 
amended Constitution that reflects the sovereign will of the people as a 
whole.19 But unless and until a supermajority of the people formally amend 
the Constitution, ordinary (majoritarian) laws enjoy weaker status under 
principles of popular sovereignty than do the higher (supermajoritarian) 
rules of the Constitution, and thus the former must bow to the latter.20 
Since the Constitution owes its status as higher law to the fact that its 
precepts earned the assent of the American people, and since the 
Constitution can only be changed through the supermajoritarian ratification 
process, it necessarily follows, originalists claim, that contemporary judges 
must give the Constitution the same meaning that it had at the time of 
ratification. 
The Constitution meant something when it was ratified, and it was that 
something that the people agreed would bind them. If a judge interprets the 
Constitution to have some meaning other than its original meaning—to 
dictate some rule other than the one by which the people agreed to be 
bound—then she acts illegitimately, as there is no democratic warrant for 
allowing a judge-made rule to trump a majoritarian law.21 A statute enacted 
 
the People’s representatives” and “the work of the People takes precedence over the work of the 
representatives of the People”). 
19 See, e.g., Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 374 (1921) (“[A]ll amendments must have the sanction 
of the people of the United States, the original fountain of power . . . and . . . ratification by these 
assemblies in three-fourths of the States shall be taken as a decisive expression of the people’s will and 
be binding on all.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 15, at 527 (Alexander Hamilton) (observing 
the “fundamental principle of republican government, which admits the right of the people to alter or 
abolish the established constitution whenever they find it inconsistent with their happiness”); Lash, 
supra note 12, at 1446 n.24 (arguing that “it is the ultimately majoritarian basis of the Constitution and 
its rules for amendment that establish the legitimacy of the document under the theory of popular 
sovereignty”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of 
the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 692 (1993) (“Article V provides a regularized 
procedure for those extraordinary occasions on which We the People reassert our quasi-revolutionary 
right to alter or abolish the form of government under which we live.”). 
20 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 203 (“Originalism provides that current majorities can only 
be restricted by the demonstrable intentions of prior supermajorities . . . .”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 
88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1043 (2004) (noting the originalist belief that “[a]lthough such original 
meaning will sometimes trump the will of current majorities, it is ultimately consistent with democracy 
because it reflects the will of engaged supermajorities”); Lash, supra note 12, at 1442 (“Popular 
sovereignty holds that laws created by ordinary political majorities are less legitimate than the 
supermajoritarian law of the Constitution due to their more attenuated relationship to the actual will of 
the people.”). 
21 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 2 (“When a judge goes beyond the meaning of the words that 
were enacted—to . . . what the courts think would meet the needs and goals of society—the judge has 
no democratic warrant.”); Lee J. Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical Traditions 
Within Constitutional Interpretation: Originalism Grounded in the Central Western Philosophical 
Tradition, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 909, 972 (2005) (“[W]hat warrant did the judiciary have in 
overruling the legislature and executive if not done pursuant to the People’s prior authoritative act 
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by an elected legislature has a far greater claim to democratic legitimacy 
than does a rule adopted by a small handful of unelected judges. But its 
claim is weaker than that of the supermajoritarian rules originally 
understood to be embodied in the Constitution.22 
To get at the point from a slightly different angle, the Constitution, as 
originally understood and collectively assented to by a supermajority of the 
people, is higher law. The only way to change that higher law is to follow 
the amendment procedures that the higher law prescribes: a supermajority 
of the people must collectively agree to alter the rules by which democracy 
will be confined by amending the Constitution through the Article V 
process. When judges give the Constitution a new meaning in the course of 
adjudication, they change the rules of higher law illegitimately, outside of 
the Article V process. Sovereignty rests with the people, not with a handful 
of unelected judges.23 
Countless originalists have developed these themes.24 To give just a 
few examples,25 Raoul Berger has argued that the “Constitution represents 
 
which was embodied in a determinate text?”); Jose Joel Alicea, Originalism in Crisis: The Movement 
Toward Indeterminate Originalism 143 (May 22, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) 
(“Ever wary of the possibility that Rule by the People might be supplanted with Rule by the Judge, 
originalism jealously guards the people’s sovereignty against encroachments by judicial actors.”); id. at 
138 (“For an originalist, the Constitution comprises the written commands of the popular sovereign to 
the people’s agents in government. The relationship between sovereign and agent is hierarchical; the 
former gives orders to the latter, who has no legitimate basis for flouting these commands.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
22 See, e.g., Lash, supra note 12, at 1446 (“Popular sovereignty thus provides an answer to one of 
the most vexing problems in modern constitutional law: the countermajoritarian difficulty. . . . Popular 
sovereignty theory resolves the difficulty by grounding judicial review in the more deeply democratic 
law of the people.” (footnote omitted)). 
23 See, e.g., Elizabeth Price Foley, Judicial Engagement, Written Constitutions, and the Value of 
Preservation: The Case of Individual Rights, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 909, 910 (2012) 
(“[Nonoriginalist judges] are actively seeking to modify the written social compact to suit their own, or 
their perception of society’s, current preferences. Judicial activism is a usurpation of the proper judicial 
role, and it undermines the proper role of We the People. Only the People may amend the written 
constitution when a sufficiently large number (i.e., a supermajority) believes strongly enough that a 
formal, written modification of the social charter is necessary.”); BERGER, supra note 10 (arguing that 
nonoriginalist interpretation amounts to an improper judicial “exercise of the amending power” 
(quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 591 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Case for Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra 
note 1, 42, 57 (“‘The people’ today, or their representatives, . . . have exclusive legal authority to 
change their own constitution. The most powerful objection to non-originalism is that it usurps their 
power to change their constitution.”); WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 155 (“[M]ethods that authorize 
judicial activism in disregard of the intentions of the founders implicitly cast the Court itself in the role 
of the sovereign, authorized to remake constitutional meaning in accord with some preferred conception 
of the political good.”); id. at 140. 
24 See, e.g., JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 190–91 (2005) (describing the “originalist understanding of the 
Constitution as law rooted in popular sovereignty . . . as a favored and powerful organizing concept” 
and noting that the heart of originalism has “depended on the sovereign act of ratification, which had 
made politically authoritative and legally compelling rules with discernable content”); Daniel A. Farber, 
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fundamental choices that have been made by the people, and the task of the 
Courts is to effectuate them . . . . When the judiciary substitutes its own 
value choices for those of the people it subverts the Constitution by 
usurpation of power.”26 That is to say, “the Justices’ substitution of their 
own meaning for that of the Founders displaces the choices made by the 
people in conventions that ratified the Constitution, and it violates the basic 
principle of government by consent of the governed.”27 Similarly, Edwin 
Meese has asserted that only an originalist “judge is properly treating the 
Constitution as the supreme law and is enforcing the will of the enduring 
and fundamental democratic majority that ratified the constitutional 
provision at issue.”28 And Justice Scalia has exclaimed: 
I care for the people that ratified the Constitution. . . . The validity of 
government depends upon the consent of the governed, and you find that 
consent in what the people agreed to. So what the people agreed to when they 
adopted the Constitution, what they agreed to when they adopted the Bill of 
Rights is what ought to govern us. Now the Bill of Rights is . . . in a sense 
anti-democratic in that it prevents the current majority from doing what it 
would like to do. But in another sense, it is quite democratic. The Bill of 
Rights was adopted, after all, democratically. It was the people self-limiting 
their power. . . . [Nonoriginalist interpretation] is not being faithful to the will 
of the people, . . . not following the will of the governed.29 
 
The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1098 (1989) (“Reduced to 
its essence, the [originalist] argument is this: If judges get their authority from the Constitution, and the 
Constitution gets its authority from the majority vote of the ratifiers, then the role of the judge is to 
carry out the will of the ratifiers.”). 
25 See also JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 54–55 (2011); ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 143, 159–64 (1990) [hereinafter 
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA]; Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 6 (1971) (asserting that “no argument that is both coherent and respectable 
can be made supporting [nonoriginalism] because a Court that makes rather than implements value 
choices cannot be squared with the presuppositions of a democratic society”); Graglia, supra note 10, at 
633–34; Rehnquist, supra note 14, at 706 (calling nonoriginalism “a formula for an end run around 
popular government”); The Honorable Justice Clarence Thomas, Judging (Apr. 8, 1996), in 45 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1996); Steven G. Calabresi, Op-Ed., The Right Judicial Litmus Test, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
1, 2007, at A23 (“Non-originalist judicial review severely distorts the allocation of powers that is 
central to the Constitution.”). 
26 BERGER, supra note 10, at 314. 
27 Id. at 22–23; see also id. at 402–27 (discussing the importance of originalism in limiting the 
judiciary’s ability to impose its policy preferences on the people). 
28 Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 10 
(1988). 
29 Original Intent and a Living Constitution (C-SPAN television broadcast Mar. 23, 2010), 15:43 to 
18:08, available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/292678-1 (remarks of Justice Scalia); see also 
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862–64 (1989) (arguing that 
originalism is less likely than nonoriginalism to lead to judges substituting their own preferences for 
those of the sovereign people). 
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The most sophisticated and thoughtful arguments along these lines 
have been offered by Michael McConnell and Keith Whittington. 
McConnell argues that an “essential characteristic[] of any theory of 
interpretation under our Constitution, which follow[s] from the function of 
constitutional interpretation in our system,” is that “it must be understood 
as having its origins in the consent of the governed.”30 “The words of the 
Constitution are not authoritative for fetishistic reasons, but because they 
are the verbal embodiment of certain collective decisions made by the 
people.”31 That is to say, 
If the Framers’ words have authority for us today, this is because, in Chief 
Justice Marshall’s words, “the people have an original right to establish, for 
their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most 
conduce to their own happiness.” This, he said, “is the basis on which the 
whole American fabric has been erected.”32 
“The theory of judicial review,” in turn, is “based on . . . the claim that 
in enforcing the Constitution [judges] are carrying out the will of the 
people.”33 “It follows, then, that judges act legitimately under the 
Constitution only when they are faithfully enforcing those collective 
decisions. To enforce something else . . . separates the text from the source 
of its authority.”34 Hence the necessity for originalism: if “[a]ll power stems 
from the sovereign people, and the authority of the Constitution comes 
from their act of sovereign will in creating it,” then “[i]t follows that the 
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with their 
understanding.”35 Judicial “interpretation must be fairly traceable to a 
decision that was made, at some level of intelligible principle, by the 
people in the course of constitution-making or amending.”36 “If the 
Constitution is held to embody principles that the people did not choose, 
such a holding has no democratic legitimacy. Judicial review is not an 
 
30 Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359, 360 (1988). 
31 Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald 
Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1278 n.45 (1997). 
32 Id. at 1278–79 (footnote omitted) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 
(1803)). 
33 Id. at 1279 n.45. 
34 Id. 
35 McConnell, supra note 2, at 1132; see also McConnell, supra note 31, at 1279 (“It would seem 
to follow that it is the principles to which the people assented, understood as nearly as is possible as 
they understood them, which should guide us today.”); id. at 1292 (“I have a great deal of affinity for 
the originalist notion that the Constitution must be read in light of the reasons that give it authority, 
from which it follows that the governing principles of the document, as understood by the Framers and 
Ratifiers, remain authoritative.”); McConnell, supra note 2, at 1132 (“If the Constitution is authoritative 
because the people of 1787 had an original right to establish a government for themselves and their 
posterity, the words they wrote should be interpreted—to the best of our ability—as they meant them.”). 
36 McConnell, supra note 30. 
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intergenerational game of bait-and-switch.”37 This, McConnell asserts, is 
“the theoretical foundation of originalism.”38 
Whittington too “seeks to ground the authority of originalist 
jurisprudence . . . in a theory of popular sovereignty,”39 and concludes that 
“popular sovereignty . . . dictates the adoption of an originalist method of 
interpretation.”40 He repeats the traditional originalist arguments that “the 
people are taken to be sovereign, and the written text of the Constitution is 
taken to be the durable expression of their will”41 and that “the durable will 
of the founders is authoritative because it represents the formal consent of 
the governed to the government, as they voluntarily accept the future 
application of coercive force to restrain individual citizens and government 
officials.”42 He further notes that this, in turn, necessitates originalist 
jurisprudence because “[a]bandoning originalism allows the judiciary to 
impose value choices that have not been authorized by democratic 
action.”43 
Whittington asserts, however, that this traditional justification for 
originalism is “inadequate” and “underdeveloped.”44 He thus sets out to 
articulate a “fully developed originalist theory of popular sovereignty.”45 
His theory is rich and refined,46 and cannot easily be summarized in a few 
paragraphs. But at its heart, it emphasizes both the uniquely deep, 
deliberative nature of constitution making, and the continued ability of the 
people to remake the Constitution to reflect their current will. 
First, Whittington argues that the Constitution reflects the sovereign 
will of the people in a way that statutes do not because the Constitution was 
the product of a unique process of open deliberation and collaboration 
between the majority and the minority.47 Whereas the legislative process 
involves party-driven, factionalized majoritarianism, the constitution-
making process involves the people coming together to deliberate for the 
greater good. At the end of that process, members of the minority acquiesce 
in the final product because they recognize that they had a fair voice in the 
deliberation and because they accept “the Constitution as written as the 
 
37 Id. 
38 McConnell, supra note 2, at 1132; see also id. at 1137 (“Originalism refers to the will of the 
people at the founding . . . .”). 
39 WHITTINGTON, supra note 12. 
40 Id. at 154. 
41 Id. at 112. 
42 Id.; see also id. at 59 (noting that the constitutional “text is not simply a list of words but is the 
embodied will of the people”). 
43 Id. at 112. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 See id. at 110–59. 
47 See id. at 145–49. 
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authoritative expression of the popular will, binding themselves as well as 
their opponents.”48 
Second, Whittington disclaims reliance on any sort of theory of “tacit 
consent” by the people in our time who did not themselves agree to the 
Constitution.49 Instead, he focuses on a notion of “potential sovereignty”—
that the Constitution is binding today because it preserves for the present 
people the ability to make higher law in the event that they choose to do so. 
This, in turn, dictates the necessity of originalist interpretation: 
[O]riginalism secures the effectiveness of a future expression of popular will. 
By maintaining the principle that constitutional meaning is determined by its 
authors, originalism provides the basis for future constitutional deliberation by 
the people. Present and future generations can only expect their own 
constitutional will to be effectuated if they are willing to give effect to prior 
such expressions.50 
“We can replicate the fundamental political act of the founders only if 
we are willing to recognize the reality of their act. Stripping them of their 
right to constitute a government would likewise strip us of our own.”51 As 
such, government officials (including judges) who act as agents of the 
people must confine themselves to the authority granted to them by the 
Constitution, as it was understood by the people who enacted it. “By 
enforcing the original terms of the constitutional contract as articulated by 
its authors, an originalist Court ensures that the efforts of the sovereign are 
not in vain, that its will is effectuated in its absence.”52 In this manner, the 
“Court is not simply an antidemocratic feature of American politics but is 
an instrument of the people in preserving the highest promise of 
democracy.”53 This is the sense in which the “fundamental basis for the 
authority of originalism is its capacity to retain a space for the popular 
sovereign.”54 
B. The Constitution as Contract 
A related defense of originalism sounds in principles of contract.55 
Michael Dorf explains that, as noted above, many originalists believe that 
 
48 Id. at 146. 
49 See id. at 129. 
50 Id. at 156. 
51 Id. at 133. 
52 Id. at 156. 
53 Id. at 111. 
54 Id. at 154; see also id. at 111 (arguing that “originalism . . . enforces the authoritative decision of 
the people acting as sovereign”). 
55 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Pragmatic Originalism?, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 517, 525 
(2009) (“[T]he strongest argument for originalism in my view comes from the idea that a constitution is 
essentially a contract.”); id. at 520 (noting that originalism is based on the “underlying idea that a 
constitution is indeed a pact, a social contract designed to create legitimate governing institutions 
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“the Constitution derives its authority from its ratification during particular 
periods in American history. Under this view, any departure from the 
understandings of those discrete periods robs constitutional interpretation 
of its claim to legitimacy.”56 In other words, “[t]he political theory 
underlying strict originalism is a form of social contract theory.”57 
Some originalists have taken the contract analogy to the next level. 
They opine that, because “the Constitution was designed and approved like 
a contract” among the American people,58 the law should treat it that way—
as something of a legally binding contract. It follows that the Constitution 
must be interpreted to reflect the actual “meeting of the minds” of the 
American people.59 That is to say, it must be interpreted to reflect the 
meaning that was understood by those who contractually agreed to be 
bound by it.60 Judge Easterbrook elaborates: “The fundamental theory of 
political legitimacy in the United States is contractarian, and contractarian 
views imply originalist . . . interpretation by the judicial branch. Otherwise 
a pack of lawyers is changing the terms of the deal, reneging on behalf of a 
society that did not appoint them for that purpose.”61 
 
responsive to the political and social divides of a society”); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1139 (2003) 
(noting the “‘reliance-based contract theory’ of constitutional interpretation” (footnote omitted) 
(quoting David McGowan, Ethos in Law and History: Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, and the 
Supreme Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 755, 756 (2001))). 
56 Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of 
Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1766 (1997). 
57 Id.; see also Luc B. Tremblay, General Legitimacy of Judicial Review and the Fundamental 
Basis of Constitutional Law, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 525, 553–54 (2003) (noting that contract-
based theories of originalism are grounded in the authority of the ratifiers to establish binding rules). 
58 Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1121 
(1998); see also Meese, supra note 28, at 8 (“A . . . purpose of a written constitution is to confer 
democratic legitimacy by formally expressing the consent of the people to the government’s exercises 
of authority. Thus, in a democracy or a republic (as opposed to a constitutional monarchy or oligarchy), 
a constitution becomes a social contract by which the people agree to be bound by laws which are made 
pursuant to and in accord with the Constitution’s commands.”). Alternatively, the Constitution might be 
viewed as a “contract between the people and the Government.” 143 CONG. REC. 2460 (1997) 
(statement of Rep. Ron Paul). 
59 Cf. Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 864 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“A contract, after all, is a meeting of the minds.”); Richmond & Alleghany R.R. v. 
R.A. Patterson Tobacco Co., 169 U.S. 311, 314 (1898) (“The contract is the concrete result of the 
meeting of the minds of the contracting parties.”). 
60 See MARK R. LEVIN, LIBERTY AND TYRANNY: A CONSERVATIVE MANIFESTO 36 (2009) (“The 
Conservative is an originalist, for he believes that much like a contract, the Constitution sets forth 
certain terms and conditions for governing that hold the same meaning today as they did yesterday and 
should tomorrow.”). 
61 Easterbrook, supra note 58. 
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C. Supermajoritarianism as Utilitarianism 
A recent advance in originalist theory comes from the work of John 
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport, who, in a series of articles over the past 
several years, have articulated “a new normative defense of originalism.”62 
This new defense is pragmatic and utilitarian; it seeks to establish that 
originalism produces normatively desirable rules for society.63 That is to 
say, “originalism advances the welfare of the present day citizens of the 
United States because it promotes constitutional interpretations that are 
likely to have better consequences today than those of nonoriginalist 
theories.”64 
That is so, argue McGinnis and Rappaport, because the Constitution 
required supermajoritarian consensus to enact and amend, and a 
“constitution that is enacted under a strict supermajority process is likely to 
be desirable.”65 “Supermajoritarian passage has many benefits, including 
promoting consensus and encouraging desirable long-term provisions.”66 
Only “provisions that enjoy consensus support” can make their way into a 
Constitution that features a supermajoritarian enactment and amendment 
process;67 constitutional provisions can “not generally be enacted unless 
they receive[] the support of significant portions of both parties.”68 Thus, 
constitutional provisions will “not be based on partisan motivations.”69 “In 
this more cooperative environment, legislators would be more likely to 
focus on the interests citizens have in common rather than their parties’ 
narrow interests.”70 Laws enacted to serve shared, long-term interests are 
inherently better than laws enacted to serve the immediate and narrow 
interests of the majority party.71 
It follows from all of this that judges should interpret the Constitution 
“according to its original meaning to preserve the benefits of the 
widespread agreement that gave it birth.”72 “It was,” after all, “by virtue of 
 
62 John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 GEO. 
L.J. 1693, 1695 (2010). 
63 See id. at 1698 & n.6; John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of 
Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 383 (2007). 
64 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 62. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 1699. 
67 Id. at 1706. 
68 Id. at 1708. 
69 Id. at 1706. 
70 Id. at 1708. Cf. WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 141 (“The fact that the constitution will be 
controlling not just today but also tomorrow directs the sovereign to consider those likely effects as 
well, pushing him toward a more universal perspective.”). 
71 See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 63, at 387 (“[M]ajorities in a party system tend to be 
partisan. Because of partisanship, majorities will tend to abuse their power . . . .”). 
72 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 62. 
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that meaning that these provisions received the widespread support that 
remains the touchstone of their beneficence.”73 
II. THE LACK OF A SUPERMAJORITARIAN, NATIONAL, BIPARTISAN, AND 
DELIBERATIVE CONSENSUS IN THE PROMULGATION AND RATIFICATION OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Part I of this Article recounted the Rockwellian portrait of American 
constitution making—as painted by originalists—as a process of near-
universal, nonpartisan, supermajoritarian agreement among the American 
people. This Part seeks to demonstrate a chasmic divide between the 
originalists’ ideal and the reality of the making of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.74 
A. Supermajoritarian, National Support? 
Article V requires double supermajorities to amend the Constitution: 
“two thirds of both Houses [of Congress]”75 and “three fourths of the 
 
73 Id. at 1696. 
74 The Fourteenth Amendment provides: 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not 
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of 
a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such 
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, 
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be 
reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number 
of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and 
Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, 
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United 
States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, 
to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion 
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of 
two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts 
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or 
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay 
any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be 
held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of 
this article. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
75 Id. art. V. Actually, Article V affords an alternative avenue for proposing amendments: “on the 
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, [Congress] shall call a Convention 
for proposing Amendments.” Id. This avenue, which also requires a supermajority at the proposal stage, 
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several States.”76 Scholars have noted that “the real aim and practical effect 
of the complicated amending procedure was . . . to ensure that passage of 
an amendment would require a nationally distributed majority.”77 One 
cannot hope to secure the assent of two-thirds of both Houses of 
Congress—especially the Senate, which is not apportioned by 
population78—and three-fourths of the states without a proposal that enjoys 
widespread support throughout the entirety of the country. 
It is this near-universal support that gives the Constitution and its 
amendments their authority in the eyes of the originalists whose work is 
discussed above in Part I. Yet the Fourteenth Amendment manifestly was 
not enacted with widespread, national, supermajoritarian support. 
The story of the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment has been well-
told elsewhere,79 and the object here is not to offer a detailed and definitive 
account. A brief summary will do. 
When the Civil War ended in early 1865, some of the previously 
secessionist governments of the Confederate states attempted to return to 
 
has never been used. See Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of a Limited Convention: An 
Originalist Analysis, 81 CONST. COMMENT. 53, 60 (2012). 
76 U.S. CONST. art. V. Article V does not, however, require supermajority votes in each state 
legislature at the ratification stage, if Congress chooses ratification by state legislatures, rather than by 
state conventions. See Carlos E. González, Popular Sovereign Generated Versus Government 
Institution Generated Constitutional Norms: When Does a Constitutional Amendment Not Amend the 
Constitution?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 127, 203 (2002) (“While Article V requires ratification by three-
fourths of the state legislatures, only a simple majority is required in each state legislature.”). The states 
are permitted to determine their own thresholds for ratification. See Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 
1306 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (three-judge court) (Stevens, J.). A few have imposed supermajority requirements. 
See id. at 1305 n.34. 
77 MARTIN DIAMOND, Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers’ Intent, in 
AS FAR AS REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES WILL ADMIT 17, 23–24 (William A. Schambra ed., 1992); see also 
Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 
96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 125–26 (1996) (explaining Article V’s emphasis on national supermajorities). 
Madison explained: 
 If we try the Constitution by its last relation, to the authority by which amendments are to be 
made, we find it neither wholly national, nor wholly federal. Were it wholly national, the supreme 
and ultimate authority would reside in the majority of the people of the Union; and this authority 
would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of every national society, to alter or 
abolish its established Government. Were it wholly federal on the other hand, the concurrence of 
each State in the Union would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. The 
mode provided by the plan of the Convention is not founded on either of these principles. In 
requiring more than a majority, and particularly, in computing the proportion by States, not by 
citizens, it departs from the national, and advances towards the federal character: In rendering the 
concurrence of less than the whole number of States sufficient, it loses again the federal, and 
partakes of the national character. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 15, at 257 (James Madison). 
78 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
79 See, e.g., JAMES E. BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM: RECONSTRUCTION AND THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1997); JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1984); JOSEPH T. SNEED III, FOOTPRINTS ON THE ROCKS OF THE 
MOUNTAIN: AN ACCOUNT OF THE ENACTMENT OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1997). 
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the Union, but Presidents Lincoln and Johnson refused to recognize them.80 
Instead, Johnson appointed for those states provisional governors who 
convened conventions of voters loyal to the Union (as determined by 
Johnson’s own criteria). Those conventions then rejected secession and 
legislated against slavery.81 
The conventions also facilitated elections of new state and federal 
legislators. Most of the new state legislatures quickly ratified the proposed 
Thirteenth Amendment, ending slavery, and the Secretary of State of the 
United States accepted those ratifications and counted them in declaring 
that Amendment to be adopted.82 
As the Congress prepared to meet for a new session at the end of 1865, 
the Southern states sent their newly elected Senators and Representatives to 
Washington. But the Republican leadership of the House and Senate 
refused to seat them.83 The resulting partial, “rump” Congress—devoid of 
Southern representation—then proposed the Fourteenth Amendment.84 
The Fourteenth Amendment made it through the Congress only 
because the congressional leaders (from the North) refused to seat the 
elected Senators and Representatives from the South. The Amendment 
received 120 votes in the House and 33 votes in the Senate—enough to 
exceed the constitutional threshold of a two-thirds majority only because 
the elected congressional contingents from the Southern states had not been 
permitted to vote. Had the full complement of Senators and Representatives 
from the South been seated (and thus included in the denominator), the 
Amendment would have “required 162 votes in the House” and 48 votes in 
the Senate to pass—far more than it would have received, given the 
universal opposition in the South.85 As Bruce Ackerman notes, “[e]very 
student of the period recognizes that, were it not for the purge of Southern 
Senators and Representatives, the ‘Congress’ meeting in June [of 1866] 
would never have mustered the two-thirds majorities required to propose 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”86 
On top of that, the Amendment would never have been ratified by 
three-fourths of the states without the use of force and coercion. There were 
thirty-seven states in 1868,87 and the Constitution required twenty-eight of 
 
80 See Harrison, supra note 8, at 393. 
81 See id. at 395–97. 
82 See id. at 396–98. 
83 See id. at 398–99. As Bruce Ackerman has pointed out, this presents something of a disconnect. 
See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 103. The Southern states were treated as part of the Union for 
purposes of ratifying the Thirteenth Amendment, but not as part of the Union when constituting the 
Congress that enacted the Fourteenth Amendment. 
84 See Harrison, supra note 8, at 401–04. The text of the Fourteenth Amendment is reproduced in 
note 74, supra. 
85 See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 102, 174; see also Harrison, supra note 8, at 404. 
86 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 102. 
87 Harrison, supra note 8, at 412. 
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them to ratify. That meant that a mere ten states voting no would have been 
enough to defeat the Amendment. Of the eleven former Confederate states, 
Tennessee—unique among the Southern states with a Republican-
dominated legislature—was the only one to initially vote to ratify the 
Amendment.88 (Tennessee’s process of ratification was, however, 
sufficiently peculiar—a quorum was reached only through the use of force 
against opposition legislators—as to raise legitimate doubts about whether 
its people were really in favor.)89 
Thus, it was impossible to ratify the Amendment without the support 
of some of the recalcitrant former Confederate states. Indeed, given that 
three non-Confederate states—Maryland, Delaware, and Kentucky—voted 
against ratification, and a fourth, California, took no action because its 
legislature was deadlocked,90 the votes of several Southern states were 
necessary to secure the Amendment’s passage. 
1. Southern Resistance.—Those votes did not come—and would 
never have come—voluntarily. It would be difficult to overstate the depth 
and breadth of opposition to the Fourteenth Amendment in the South. 
Leading Southern newspapers and politicians routinely described it as an 
“insulting outrage,”91 an “abominable,”92 “obnoxious measure,”93 and a 
“nefarious,”94 “foul,”95 “monstrous proposition.”96 There was a remarkable 
 
88 See id. at 404 & n.156. Congress promptly rewarded Tennessee by readmitting it to the Union 
and seating its Senators and Representatives in Congress. See id. at 404. 
89 See HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 189 (1908) 
(“And in the case of Tennessee it may be said that it had been ratified against the will of the people of 
that State.”). Opponents of the Amendment in the state legislature sought to avoid a vote in order to 
defeat the quorum requirement, but they were tracked down, arrested, and dragged to the legislative 
chamber—despite the support of their constituents, who tried to help them hide, and despite writs of 
habeas corpus issued by the state courts demanding that they be released. See JAMES, supra note 79, at 
19–23. The Speaker of the Tennessee House refused to sign a certificate of ratification because he 
believed that there had been no legitimate quorum in the legislature, but Congress simply ignored his 
objections. See id. at 26. In the words of one historian, the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
Tennessee was the result of “some of the most violent and irregular scenes in the history of 
parliamentary government in America.” 1 ELLIS PAXSON OBERHOLTZER, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 187 (1917). 
90 See CHARLES WALLACE COLLINS, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATES 5 (1912). 
California’s House was controlled by Democrats, and its Senate was controlled by Republicans, “so that 
it was useless to vote.” FLACK, supra note 89, at 207. 
91 MISSISSIPPI SENATE JOURNAL 8 (1866), quoted in JAMES, supra note 79, at 150 (remarks of 
Mississippi Governor Benjamin G. Humphreys). 
92 Editorial, The Constitutional Amendment In and Out of Congress, DAILY SUN (Ga.), Jan. 12, 
1867, at 2, quoted in BOND, supra note 79, at 235. 
93 Editorial, The Constitutional Amendment, TRI-WKLY. CONSTITUTIONALIST (Augusta, Ga.), Oct. 
17, 1866, at 2, quoted in JAMES, supra note 79, at 92. 
94 Editorial, National Politics, WILMINGTON J. (N.C.), Sept. 20, 1866, at 2, quoted in JAMES, supra 
note 79, at 102. 
95 Editorial, The Bad Faith of the Radicals, FED. UNION (Milledgeville, Ga.), Oct. 16, 1866, quoted 
in JAMES, supra note 79, at 92. 
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consensus against it among both Southern politicians and the (white) 
Southern people.97 
Southerners felt that the Amendment was downright insulting and 
debasing to them as a people. “‘Humiliating’ and ‘degrading’ were the 
adjectives most frequently used to describe its provisions.”98 The people 
felt that the process by which the Amendment had been proposed—in a 
Congress that refused to seat the Southern contingents—combined with the 
Amendment’s draconian terms—providing for some measure of racial 
equality, forcing the enfranchisement of African Americans while at the 
same time disenfranchising many former white Confederates, and vastly 
expanding the power of the federal government—were “intentionally 
shamefully offensive to the Southern people.”99 The “true and gallant 
Southern man feels his cheeks mantle with shame to think of it.”100 As one 
Southerner colorfully put it in a letter to the Governor of North Carolina, it 
felt as though Congress was asking the men of the South to “[d]rink our 
own piss and eat our own dung.”101 
This they would not do.102 The common view was that the “Southern 
people ‘should not at least cooperate in [their] own humiliation’” by 
ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment.103 “The very idea [was] too disgusting 
and shocking to be entertained by the Southern mind. . . . The shame of the 
deed, if done, would resound throughout all the ages of the world.”104 It 
 
96 JAMES, supra note 79, at 103 (quoting N.C. ARGUS, Oct. 11, 1866). 
97 See Joseph B. James, Southern Reaction to the Proposal of the Fourteenth Amendment, 22 J. S. 
HIST. 477, 477, 482 (1956) (noting the “remarkable consensus” of opposition in the Southern 
legislatures, and the “active public opinion in the South against the Fourteenth Amendment”); JAMES, 
supra note 79, at 10 (“Before any state in the South had acted, the Chicago Tribune summarized 
opinion from Southern newspapers as almost unanimously opposed to the amendment.” (citing 
Editorial, The South and the Offer of Congress, CHI. TRIB., June 21, 1866)). The views of Southern 
blacks will be considered in Part III, infra. 
98 BOND, supra note 79, at 55. 
99 Editorial dated June 22, 1866, Reconstruction, WILMINGTON J. (N.C.), June 28, 1866, at 4, 
quoted in JAMES, supra note 79, at 101. 
100 BOND, supra note 79, at 38 (quoting OXFORD FALCON (Miss.), Nov. 11, 1866) (referring to 
Section 3 of the Amendment). 
101 Letter from D.F. Caldwell to Jonathan Worth (Sept. 30, 1866), in 2 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF 
JONATHAN WORTH 802 (J.G. de Roulhac Hamilton ed., 1909) (emphasis omitted), quoted in BOND, 
supra note 79, at 55. 
102 See, e.g., Editorial, The Constitutional Amendment—Duty of the Southern States, GA. WKLY. 
TELEGRAPH, June 18, 1866, at 5, quoted in JAMES, supra note 79, at 82 (“Every honest Southerner will 
reject with scorn the infamous condition, and despise the craven spirits that suppose us capable of such 
base submission.”). Even some Northerners thought that it was “impossible for any decent Southerner 
ever to vote for it.” Letter from John Quincy Adams to Montgomery Blair (Nov. 29, 1866), quoted in 
JAMES, supra note 79, at 120. 
103 Editorial, Congressional Reconstruction—The Amendment, DAILY CLARION & STANDARD 
(Jackson, Miss.), June 20, 1866, at 2, quoted in JAMES, supra note 79, at 10. 
104 Editorial, The Legislature and the Constitutional Amendment, RICH. WHIG, Jan. 9, 1867 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting LOUISVILLE J.), quoted in BOND, supra note 79, at 147. 
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would be, according to the Arkansas legislature’s Committee on Federal 
Relations, “a sacrifice of principle, dignity, and self-respect” and an “act of 
disgrace.”105 If the South were to ratify, she would, according to Florida 
Governor David Walker, be “eviscerated of her manhood [sic], despoiled 
of her honor, recreant of her duty, and without her self-respect.”106 As the 
Texas Senate Committee on Federal Relations put it, ratification would 
indicate the “loss of our honor as a people, and our self-respect as 
individual men.”107 
The South was therefore fervently unwilling to ratify, even though it 
was understood that the failure to do so would surely prevent the Congress 
from readmitting the former Confederate states to the Union.108 Even at that 
price, the Amendment was simply too vile to the Southern states for them 
to voluntarily give their consent.109 The Governor of North Carolina flatly 
declared that “[n]o Southern State, where the people are free to vote, will 
adopt it.”110 As the joint committee of the North Carolina legislature to 
which the Amendment had been referred put it, the South “can never 
consent to it,—Never!”111 
There were a number of reasons for the South’s vehement, hysterical 
opposition. For one thing, of course, Southerners objected to the process by 
which the Amendment had been proposed—by a Congress from which the 
Southern contingents had been excluded.112 But the South also objected 
 
105 6 AMERICAN ANNUAL CYCLOPAEDIA AND REGISTER OF IMPORTANT EVENTS OF THE YEAR 
1866, at 27 (D. Appleton & Co. eds., 1868), quoted in JAMES, supra note 79, at 99. 
106 BOND, supra note 79, at 173 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Editorial, Gov. 
Murphy’s Message, DES ARC CITIZEN, Nov. 17, 1866, at 2, quoted in BOND, supra note 79, at 194 
(arguing that the Amendment “destroys the honor of Arkansas, insults the memory of her noble dead, 
and writes infamy and disgrace upon her brow”). 
107 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF TEXAS, ELEVENTH LEGISLATURE 423 (1866), quoted in James, 
supra note 97, at 485; see also James, supra note 97, at 485 (“Such words were to be repeated endlessly 
in the South . . . .”). 
108 See James, supra note 97, at 489 (“Most newspapers took the attitude of the Abbeville (South 
Carolina) Press that it would be better ‘to remain forever unrepresented than accept terms so 
humiliating.’”); Editorial dated June 22, 1866, Reconstruction, WILMINGTON J. (N.C.), June 28, 1866, 
at 4, quoted in JAMES, supra note 79, at 101 (arguing that it would be better to submit to a provisional 
government than to surrender “honor and manhood” voluntarily). 
109 See, e.g., BOND, supra note 79, at 38 (arguing that “no honorable people would voluntarily 
sanction” the Amendment (quoting JACKSON WKLY. CLARION, Oct. 10, 1866)); Editorial, 
Congressional Action, NATCHEZ DAILY COURIER (Miss.), June 5, 1866, at 2, quoted in JAMES, supra 
note 79, at 148 (“[W]e trust no Southern State will ever yield its sanction.”). 
110 Letter from Jonathan Worth to Benjamin S. Hedrik (July 4, 1866), reprinted in 2 THE 
CORRESPONDENCE OF JONATHAN WORTH, supra note 101, at 666; James, supra note 97, at 469 n.8. 
111 JAMES, supra note 79, at 107. 
112 See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO 
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 93–96 (1988). The Little Rock Daily Gazette, for instance, objected that the 
Amendment was improper because it was never “acted upon by a Congress of such a character as is 
provided for by the Constitution, inasmuch as nearly one-third of the States were refused representation 
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vociferously on the merits. Two of the principal substantive objections 
were that the Amendment treated blacks as the equals of whites and that it 
undermined federalism by transferring far too much authority to the federal 
government.113 
First the racial issue. As William Nelson has noted, “[m]uch of the 
opposition to the Fourteenth Amendment, both Northern and Southern, was 
deeply racist in tone and character.”114 Section 1 of the Amendment—
which contains the Citizenship Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, and the Due Process Clause115—clearly 
mandated some substantial degree of racial equality. For that reason, 
Southerners derisively referred to the Fourteenth Amendment as the “negro 
equalization amendment,”116 and were terrified that it would “giv[e] 
negroes political and social equality with the whites.”117 (It might even, 
they worried, someday be interpreted to preclude laws banning interracial 
marriage.)118 White Southerners adamantly refused to support an 
amendment that would “compel [them] to live on a level with the sickening 
stench of degraded humanity.”119 
In addition, Section 2 of the Amendment—which apportioned seats in 
the House of Representatives by population, but proportionally reduced the 
representation of states that do not have universal suffrage for adult 
men120—appeared to force the Southern states to enfranchise the freed 
slaves, else they would drastically reduce their own power in Congress. 
This too was unacceptable. Southerners believed it “a stupendous folly to 
remove the blacks from the tutelage of the superiour [sic] race.”121 As 
 
in the Congress which acted upon this amendment.” Constitutional Amendment, LITTLE ROCK DAILY 
GAZETTE, Dec. 13, 1866, at 2, quoted in NELSON, supra, at 93 & 227 n.14. 
113 See NELSON, supra note 112, at 96; Editorial, The Constitutional Amendments, NATCHEZ DAILY 
COURIER (Miss.), June 14, 1866, at 2, quoted in BOND, supra note 79, at 37 (declaring that the 
“amendments . . . stink in the nostrils of honest men”); BOND, supra note 79, at 215 (objecting that the 
Amendment would “permanently change the form of government [and] force negro equality and negro 
suffrage upon the country” (quoting GALVESTON WKLY. NEWS, Feb. 14, 1866)). 
114 NELSON, supra note 112, at 96. 
115 See supra note 74. 
116 BOND, supra note 79, at 86 (quoting S.W., Oct. 10, 1866). 
117 The Constitutional Amendment, DAILY ARK. GAZETTE (Little Rock), Nov. 2, 1866, at 2, quoted 
in BOND, supra note 79, at 192; see also, e.g., FLACK, supra note 89, at 158 (opining that the primary 
objection to the Amendment is to Section 1, which “forbids a State from depriving him (a negro) of any 
rights or privileges which a white man may possess” (quoting MONTGOMERY MAIL, Feb. 1867)). 
118 See BOND, supra note 79, at 59 (discussing the report of the North Carolina Joint Select 
Committee). 
119 Editorial, Negro Equality—The Civil Rights Law Begins to Operate, ROME WKLY. COURIER 
(Ga.), Apr. 27, 1866, at 1, quoted in BOND, supra note 79, at 232. 
120 See supra note 74. 
121 Editorial, DAILY RICH. EXAMINER, Jan. 6, 1866, at 2, quoted in NELSON, supra note 112, at 98; 
see also JAMES, supra note 79, at 111 (“No sane man would desire to extend the right of suffrage to 
these people without ‘abridgement’ . . . .” (quoting FLORIDA HOUSE JOURNAL, 2d Session 75–80 (1866) 
(report of Joint Committee on Federal Relations))). 
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Georgia Governor C.J. Jenkins explained, white Southerners believed that 
it was foolish to give the vote to the blacks, “nearly all of whom are 
notoriously unqualified for it.”122 Indeed, many Southerners viewed the 
Amendment as a “nefarious conspiracy to transfer, so far as crafty and 
iniquitous legislation can effect the object, the government, the civilization 
of these States from the white race to negroes.”123 
On top of (and perhaps closely related to) these viciously racist 
objections, Southerners articulated equally strident federalist concerns. 
“[T]he perennial Southern obsession with states’ rights,” explains one 
historian, “permeated the general public discussion” of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.124 The South was concerned that the Amendment would grant 
far too much legislative power to the federal Congress: “It confers in 
Congress large and undefined power, at the expense of the reserved rights 
of the State. It transfers to the United States a criminal and police 
regulation over the inhabitants of the States, touching matters purely 
domestic.”125 Indeed, Southerners thought that the Amendment would give 
Congress “absolute control over all the people of a State and their domestic 
concerns.”126 That, in turn, would “alter the form and fashion of our 
Government . . . [and] centralize all power in the Federal Congress, making 
the States mere appendages to a vast oligarchy, at the National Capital.”127 
As Florida Governor David Walker put it: 
 
122 4 THE CONFEDERATE RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 545 (Allen D. Candler ed., 1910), 
quoted in JAMES, supra note 79, at 91; see also JAMES, supra note 79, at 61 (noting that a Texas Senate 
committee argued that blacks were not morally or intellectually qualified to vote); id. at 94 
(“[Southerners] objected to black suffrage most of all, for they believed that largely uneducated 
population incapable of governing.”). 
123 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ELEVENTH LEGISLATURE, STATE OF TEXAS 
578–79 (1866) (Committee on Federal Relations), quoted in James, supra note 97, at 484. 
124 BOND, supra note 79, at 102. See, e.g., id. at 103 (dubbing the Amendment “a violation of the 
rights of one quarter of the states, . . . a gross usurpation of the rights of the states, . . . a centralization 
of power in the national government” (omissions in original) (quoting MONTGOMERY DAILY MAIL, 
Oct. 19, 1866 (quoting Alabama Governor Robert M. Patton))); BOND, supra note 79, at 128 (declaring 
the Amendment to be “subversive of all State rights” (quoting ABBEVILLE PRESS (S.C.), Oct, 19, 
1866)). 
125 BOND, supra note 79, at 39 (quoting JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI 78–79 (1866) (report of the Mississippi Joint Standing Committee on State and 
Federal Relations)). 
126 BOND, supra note 79, at 194 (quoting LITTLE ROCK DAILY CONSERVATIVE, Apr. 12, 1867). 
127 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF TEXAS, ELEVENTH LEGISLATURE 422–23 (1866) (report of the 
Texas Senate Committee on Federal Relations), quoted in JAMES, supra note 79, at 61; see also BOND, 
supra note 79, at 37 (objecting that the Amendment would transfer “all power to an oligarch in 
Congress” (quoting VICKSBURG DAILY HERALD (Miss.), June 1, 1866)); Editorial, The Legislature, 
CHARLESTON DAILY COURIER, Nov. 27, 1866, at 2, quoted in JAMES, supra note 79, at 117 (“Whether 
we consider the manner of its proposal or the nature of its provisions, it is alike inconsistent with 
statesmanship or policy. . . . It changes the character of the Government by transferring to Congress the 
supreme power over the States.”). 
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These two Sections [1 and 5] taken together, give Congress the power to 
legislate in all cases touching the citizenship, life, liberty or property of every 
individual in the Union, of whatever race or color, and leave no further use for 
the State governments. It is in fact a measure of consolidation entirely 
changing the form of the government.128 
One newspaper editorialist wondered, “What evil, then, . . . could 
Congress fasten upon the Southern States which is not constitutionally and 
legally provided for in this amendment?”129 
The South further worried that the Amendment would also unduly 
augment the power of the federal judiciary at the expense of its state 
counterparts. It “would enlarge the judicial powers of the General 
Government to such gigantic dimensions as would not only overshadow 
and weaken the authority and influence of the State courts, but might 
possibly reduce them to a complete nullity.”130 
In combination, the South believed, this augmentation of federal 
legislative and judicial power would work an unacceptable, fundamental 
change in the very nature of our country.131 It would “destroy the 
limitations of the Constitution, and make the United States Government 
omnipotent.”132 One Southerner phrased the concern in these terms: 
 
128 JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF 
FLORIDA AT THE 2D SESSION OF THE FOURTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY 8 (J.B. Oliver 1866), quoted in 
BOND, supra note 79, at 173–74; see also JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF ARKANSAS, SIXTEENTH SESSION 
259–60 (Little Rock, Price & Barton 1870) (report of the Arkansas Committee on Federal Relations), 
quoted in BOND, supra note 79, at 196 (“The great and enormous power sought to be conferred on 
Congress . . . takes from the States all control over all the people in their local and their domestic 
concerns, and virtually abolishes the States.”); CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE ORIGINAL 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 68 (1981) (“The first section of this amendment, 
considered in connection with the fifth, is virtually an annulment of State authority in regard to rights of 
citizenship. It invests the Congress of the United States with extraordinary power at the expense of the 
States.” (quoting Committee on Federal Relations of the Florida House Report of November 23, 1866)); 
Editorial, The Constitutional (Howard) Amendment, WKLY. SENTINEL (Raleigh), Oct. 15, 1866, at 1, 
quoted in FLACK, supra note 89, at 156 n.55 (“That amendment, we hold, is adverse . . . to the inherent 
and rightful powers of the States, provides for and looks to a consolidated sovereignty, instead of a 
government of limited powers, [and] breaks down the wholesome checks of the Constitution and of the 
State governments . . . .”). 
129 Editorial, Ought the Southern States to Adopt the Constitutional (Howard) Amendment?, WKLY. 
SENTINEL (Raleigh), Oct. 15, 1866, at 2 (emphasis omitted), quoted in FLACK, supra note 89, at 157. 
130 Governor’s Message, MOBILE DAILY ADVERTISER & REG., Nov. 13, 1866, at 2 (remarks of 
Alabama Governor R.M. Patton), quoted in NELSON, supra note 112, at 105; see also JAMES, supra 
note 79, at 151 (“This Amendment would disturb, to a degree which no jurist can foresee, the 
established relation between the Federal and State Courts.” (quoting MISSISSIPPI SENATE JOURNAL 196 
(1866) (report of the Standing Committee on State and Federal Relations))). 
131 See, e.g., Editorial, The Proposed Constitutional Amendment, DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Atlanta), 
Oct. 4, 1866, at 2, quoted in FLACK, supra note 89, at 154 (“Should the amendment become a part of 
the Constitution, we shall have a far different government from that inherited from our fathers.” 
(quoting Mississippi Judge Sharkey)). 
132 Editorial, The Nation, CHARLESTON MERCURY, Dec. 4, 1866, at 2, quoted in BOND, supra note 
79, at 126; see also TEXAS HOUSE JOURNAL 578 (1866) (report of the Committee on Federal Relations), 
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“[States will] distain the whole thing as . . . a fraud and a swindle. This 
Amendment destroys the independance [sic] and separate existence of the 
States, and changes our whole form of Government . . . . We would be no 
longer a Union of States but a Nation.”133 In fact, the hyperbole ran, “[f]rom 
the moment of its engraftment upon the Constitution of the United States, 
the States would in effect cease to exist as bodies politic.”134 
Mississippi Governor Humphreys summed up the Southern opposition 
to the Amendment in a fiery address to his state’s legislature: 
This amendment, adopted by a Congress of less than three-fourths of the 
States of the Union, in palpable violation of the rights of more than one-fourth 
of the States, is such an insulting outrage and denial of the equal rights of so 
many of our worthiest citizens who have shed lustre and glory upon our 
section and our race, both in the forum and in the field, such a gross 
usurpation of the rights of the State, and such a centralization of power in the 
Federal Government, that I presume, a mere reading of it, will cause its 
rejection by you.135 
If the states were to do otherwise, Southerners insisted, then freedom 
might well come to an end altogether. “If these amendments are adopted it 
will radically change the form of the Government which we have inherited 
from our fathers, if it does not in its ultimate consequences destroy our 
boasted freedom, and extinguish the torch of republican liberty in this 
Western world.”136 
 
quoted in BOND, supra note 79, at 216 (“There is scarcely any limit to the power sought to be 
transferred by this section from the States to the United States.” (referring to Section 1)); JOURNAL OF 
THE SENATE OF ARKANSAS, SIXTEENTH SESSION 260 (Little Rock, Price & Barton 1870) (report of the 
Committee on Federal Relations, Dec. 10, 1866), quoted in ANTIEAU, supra note 128 (lamenting that 
the Amendment “takes from the States all control over all the people in their local and their domestic 
concerns, and virtually abolishes the States”); JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF 
ARKANSAS, SIXTEENTH SESSION 287–89, quoted in ANTIEAU, supra note 128 (warning that “the 
sovereignty of the States might be completely subverted, by divesting them of the rights now secured by 
the Constitution”). 
133 Letter from George C. Watkins to David Walker (Aug. 22, 1868), quoted in BOND, supra note 
79, at 196; see also Editorial, Congress and Restoration: The State of the Question, HINDS COUNTY 
GAZETTE (Raymond, Miss.), June 22, 1866, quoted in BOND, supra note 79, at 37 (arguing that the 
Amendment would “make[] the United States no longer thirty-six States, but one State”); Editorial, The 
Constitutional Amendments, NATCHEZ DAILY COURIER (Miss.), June 14, 1866, quoted in BOND, supra 
note 79, at 38 (alleging that, under the Amendment, the “States hereafter are but provinces”). 
134 FLORIDA STATE SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 128, at 102 (Committee on Federal Relations 
Report), quoted in BOND, supra note 79, at 174. 
135 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI AT A CALLED 
SESSION, OCTOBER 1866, at 8 (Jackson, J.J. Shannon & Co. 1866), quoted in BOND, supra note 79, at 
38–39. 
136 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF TEXAS, ELEVENTH LEGISLATURE 422 (1866) (report of the Senate 
Committee on Federal Relations), quoted in BOND, supra note 79, at 217; see also Editorial, The 
Constitutional Amendment, DAILY ARK. GAZETTE, Nov. 3, 1866, at 2, quoted in BOND, supra note 79, 
at 192 (arguing that the Amendment would create “a Government, which, under the form of a Republic, 
will be as despotic as an absolute monarchy”); BOND, supra note 79, at 87 (arguing that the 
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Those few Southern officials who spoke in favor of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (most of whom were pro-Union and had come into power only 
through the machinations of the federal government) did so for purely 
prudential reasons. They feared the wrath of the North, and worried that the 
South’s failure to ratify the Amendment would lead the North to impose 
even less palatable terms in its stead.137 The Governor of Arkansas, for 
instance, urged ratification, but “on purely pragmatic grounds, favoring the 
substance of the amendment no more than those who strongly opposed 
it.”138 
Those scattered pleas were drowned out by the deafening chorus of 
opposition. With the exception of Tennessee, discussed above,139 the 
Southern legislatures all voted overwhelmingly to reject the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The votes against the Amendment were unanimous in almost 
half of the Southern legislatures, and nearly so in all of the others.140 Those 
votes made clear that, as former South Carolina Provisional Governor B.F. 
Perry explained to President Johnson, “[w]orse terms may be imposed by 
Congress, but they will be imposed & not voluntarily accepted.”141 The 
Southern people held firm to the view expressed by one newspaper editor: 
 
Amendment would bring about “the end of American constitutional liberty” (quoting NEW ORLEANS 
PICAYUNE, June 26, 1866)); Editorial, The Proposed Constitutional Amendment, DAILY 
INTELLIGENCER (Atlanta), Oct. 4, 1866, at 2, quoted in FLACK, supra note 89, at 154 (“Then indeed will 
the Sun of Liberty have set in the South.”). 
137 See, e.g., BOND, supra note 79, at 103–04 (noting that Alabama Governor Robert M. Patton 
ultimately decided that it would be best to ratify the Amendment, but he explained to voters that he 
remained opposed to it “in principle” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 145 (noting that 
Virginia Governor Francis Pierpont urged ratification “in a message suffused with Realpolitik”); id. at 
196 (noting that Arkansas Governor Isaac Murphy supported the Amendment only on prudential 
grounds). 
138 JAMES, supra note 79, at 113; see also FLACK, supra note 89, at 195 (noting that the Governor 
of Alabama eventually changed his mind and supported “the ratification of the Amendment as a matter 
of necessity and expediency,” but “he added that his views as to the merits of the Amendment had not 
changed in the least”). 
139 See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. 
140 See FLACK, supra note 89, at 203 (noting that the Virginia Senate rejected unanimously, and the 
Virginia House rejected 74–1); JAMES, supra note 79, at 99–100 (noting that the Arkansas Senate 
rejected 24–1, and the Arkansas House rejected 68–2); id. at 107 (noting that the Amendment received 
only one vote in the North Carolina Senate, and was defeated in the North Carolina House 93–10); id. at 
112 (noting that both the Florida House and the Florida Senate rejected unanimously); id. at 119 (noting 
that the South Carolina House rejected 95–1 and the South Carolina Senate rejected unanimously); id. 
at 130 (noting that the Alabama Senate rejected 28–3, and the Alabama House rejected 69–8); id. at 152 
(noting that the Mississippi House and Senate both rejected unanimously); id. at 154 (noting that the 
Louisiana House and Senate both rejected unanimously); James, supra note 97, at 486 (noting that 
Georgia rejected unanimously “in the Senate and with only two dissenting voices in the House”); id. at 
485 (noting that the Texas House rejected 70–5, and the Texas Senate rejected 27–1). 
141 Letter from B.F. Perry to Andrew Johnson (Nov. 10, 1866), reprinted in 11 THE PAPERS OF 
ANDREW JOHNSON 449 (Paul H. Bergeron ed., 1994), quoted in JAMES, supra note 79, at 116. 
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“Never, never should the South adopt it—never till absolutely, literally, 
forced to do it!”142 
And forced they were. When ratification finally came, it came at 
gunpoint. 
2. The Northern Response.—Upon the initial proposal of the 
Amendment in 1866, the highly coercive background—with the South 
unrepresented in Congress and being led to believe that worse terms would 
come if it did not cooperate143—was enough to prompt President Johnson to 
write that, if the South were to ratify, “it can in no way be imputed to them 
as their voluntary act.”144 Yet the South held firm, and did not ratify. Then, 
when the Radical Republicans won convincingly in the 1866 elections in 
the North—having campaigned in favor of the Amendment and in 
opposition to President Johnson’s support for moderation in 
Reconstruction145—the Southern states received a clear message that things 
were going to get a whole lot worse if they still refused to ratify. At that 
point, “no Southern leader could consider the amendment solely on its 
merits as possible constitutional law.”146 And yet the South held firm again, 
and still did not ratify. 
By this time, the North had seen enough. The prevailing sentiment in 
the Republican Congress was that, in Senator Doolittle’s words, “the 
people of the South have rejected the constitutional amendment, and 
therefore we will march upon them and force them to adopt it at the point 
of the bayonet, and establish military power over them until they do adopt 
it.”147 Thus, before the new Fortieth Congress convened, the old Thirty-
Ninth Congress met for a final session in late 1866 and early 1867, during 
which it enacted (over President Johnson’s veto) the first Military 
Reconstruction Act.148 That Act announced that “no legal State 
governments . . . exist[]” in the ten former Confederate states not currently 
represented in Congress, and declared that those states were to be placed 
under military rule.149 The Act divided the South into five military districts, 
 
142 BOND, supra note 79, at 232 (quoting S. HERALD (Liberty, Miss.), Oct. 22, 1866). 
143 See, e.g., JAMES, supra note 79, at 58–59 (“[T]his plan contains the best terms you will ever 
get—and they should be promptly accepted. . . . Don’t let Andy Johnson deceive you. He don’t know 
the Northern people.” (quoting Letter from Rep. Rutherford B. Hayes of Ohio to Guy M. Bryan of 
Texas (Oct. 1, 1866))). 
144 Id. at 31 (quoting President Andrew Johnson, Speech (undated draft)). 
145 See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 505 n.111 
(1989) (“The Fourteenth Amendment was the centerpiece of the Republican campaign in 1866 . . . .”); 
Harrison, supra note 8, at 405 (“When the voters went to the polls, the Democrats . . . got their clock 
cleaned. The Fortieth Congress would have crushing Republican majorities.”). 
146 James, supra note 97, at 486. 
147 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1644 (1867) (remarks of Sen. Doolittle (R–WI)). 
148 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428. 
149 Id. pmbl., § 1. 
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each to be governed by a military commander.150 The states in those 
districts could escape military rule and be readmitted to the Union only by: 
establishing new governments under new state constitutions, granting the 
right to vote to African Americans, and ratifying the Fourteenth 
Amendment.151 Shortly thereafter, when the Southern states continued to 
drag their feet, Congress passed a supplementary Reconstruction Act that 
instructed the military commanders to instigate and supervise the 
reconstruction process: to register voters and hold elections for the people 
to determine whether to have constitutional conventions, and if so, to elect 
delegates to those conventions.152 The military commanders were then to 
facilitate referenda on the state constitutions that the conventions 
produced.153 
One Northern Democrat in Congress described the procedures outlined 
in the Reconstruction Acts in the following terms: 
You go to the people of these ten States with the bayonet in one hand and your 
proposed constitutional amendment in the other, and ask them to make their 
choice—the amendment . . . or the bayonet and the sword and military 
government. That is, you propose to coerce by military power the people of 
these States into a ratification of your constitutional amendment . . . .154 
President Johnson echoed that the “military rule which [the 
Reconstruction Acts] establish[] is plainly to be used . . . solely as a means 
of coercing the people into the adoption of principles and measures to 
which it is known that they are opposed.”155 
That is just what happened. Pursuant to the Reconstruction Acts, the 
military commanders imposed military rule, disbanded the existing state 
governments, and removed many state officials—including several 
Governors—who stood in their way.156 The military commanders then 
supervised the process of registering voters, electing delegates to state 
constitutional conventions (through elections in which many former 
Confederates were disqualified from voting), drafting and ratifying new 
state constitutions, and electing new governments pursuant to those new 
state constitutions.157 
 
150 See id. § 1. 
151 See id. § 5. 
152 See Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, §§ 1–4, 15 Stat. 2, 2–3. 
153 See id. § 4. 
154 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1333 (1867) (remarks of Rep. Finck (D–OH)). 
155 Id. at 1969 (veto message of President Andrew Johnson), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=72072&st=johnson&st1=veto#axzz1wTnnqUCm. 
156 See JAMES, supra note 79, at 211–12; Harrison, supra note 8, at 379 n.14. 
157 See JAMES, supra note 79, at 211–12; Harrison, supra note 8, at 406–08. 
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Those new state legislatures—created under state constitutions that 
had been drafted by federal military mandate158—were then tasked with 
ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment as a condition of ending military rule 
and gaining readmittance to the Union.159 At that point, the beleaguered 
Southern press began to advocate compliance, both to get their homeland 
back from the Northern army, and to begin the process of rebuilding their 
devastated economy.160 Southern politicians grudgingly followed suit. They 
were prepared “to embrace the Congressional plan of reconstruction—not 
as a matter of choice—but from stern necessity.”161 As Alabama Governor 
Robert Patton put it, “to contend against [the Fourteenth Amendment] now 
is simply to struggle against the inevitable.”162 One historian explains that 
“[r]atification was reluctantly accepted as the price required for other 
developments deemed absolutely necessary.”163 “Southerners responded 
unhappily to the application of force and the desire for peace rather than to 
any real support for the amendment.”164 They were beat down, tired of 
living under military rule, and out of options.165 
 
158 Many Southerners questioned the legitimacy and representative authority of these new 
governments. For instance, Governor Jonathan Worth of North Carolina wrote to the new legislators, “I 
regard all of you as in effect appointees of the military power of the United States, and not as deriving 
your powers from the consent of those you claim to govern.” ROBERT SELPH HENRY, THE STORY OF 
RECONSTRUCTION 317 (1963) (quoting Letter from Jonathan Worth to W.W. Holden (June 30, 1868)); 
see also Editorial, The New Revolution, CHARLESTON DAILY COURIER, July 6, 1868, at 2, quoted in 
JAMES, supra note 79, at 252 (“To-day the Legislature, created by the Reconstruction Acts, and who 
owe their origin not to the votes of the accustomed voters of our State, but to the Radical majority in 
Congress, and the presence of arms, will convene.”). 
159 See JAMES, supra note 79, at 215–16. 
160 See id. at 212–13. 
161 A.R. Johnston, Address at Sardis, Mississippi (Oct. 13, 1869), in Speech of Hon. A.R. Johnston, 
FOREST WKLY. REG. (Miss.), Nov. 17, 1869, at 1, quoted in BOND, supra note 79, at 44. 
162 JAMES, supra note 79, at 213 (quoting NEW ORLEANS TIMES, Mar. 8, 1867); see also Letter of 
Hon. T.J. Wharton, DAILY CLARION (Jackson, Miss.), Mar. 16, 1867, at 2, quoted in JAMES, supra note 
79, at 214 (“We have to deal with things as they are—not as we would have them.”); G.T. Beauregard, 
Southern Relief Bill, NEW ORLEANS TIMES, Mar. 26, 1867, at 6, quoted in JAMES, supra note 79, at 253 
(“[A] futile resistance would only cause our rivets to be driven closer.”). 
163 JAMES, supra note 79, at 304. 
164 Id. at 303; see also id. at 244 (noting that North Carolinians “submitted to . . . the ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment . . . with resignation to a fate over which they had lost control”); id. at 245 
(noting that the North Carolina legislature ratified “[d]espite the existence of such strong feelings 
among the people of North Carolina”). 
165 But see 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 204 (implying that the Southern ratifications were still, 
at least in some sense, voluntary, because “Congress had not relieved Republicans in each state from 
the formidable task of repeatedly mobilizing majority support for their effort to represent the People—
first, in authorizing a constitutional convention; next, in approving the new Republican constitution; and 
finally, in gaining legislative consent for the Fourteenth Amendment”). Ackerman views the 
Reconstruction Acts as merely “triggering decisions—leaving it up to the (nationally defined) People of 
each state to determine whether they would go along with the nation-centered enterprise of constitutive 
redefinition initiated by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 205. 
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The new Southern legislatures all ratified the Fourteenth Amendment 
over the next several years.166 Congress accepted those ratifications, and 
declared the Amendment adopted as soon as twenty-nine states (including 
the first six of the unrepresented Southern states) had ratified it.167 
It should be obvious that this story bears virtually no resemblance to 
the idealized process of lawmaking by national supermajoritarian 
consensus that many originalists believe to be the essential hallmark of 
constitutional legitimacy and the underlying normative basis for 
originalism itself. Six of the twenty-nine ratifying states had ratified at 
gunpoint. Two others—Ohio and New Jersey—were counted in the total 
despite the fact that their legislatures had already rescinded their 
ratification votes.168 And another ratifying state—West Virginia—was of 
 
166 See Harrison, supra note 8, at 408. 
167 See JAMES, supra note 79, at 296–97. 
168 When electoral winds changed in the Democrats’ direction, the legislatures of Ohio, New 
Jersey, and Oregon all voted to rescind their former ratifications of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
COLLINS, supra note 90; Gabriel J. Chin & Anjali Abraham, Beyond the Supermajority: Post-Adoption 
Ratification of the Equality Amendments, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 25, 35–36, 45–47 (2008). In the cases of 
Ohio and New Jersey, this happened before the Amendment had received enough ratification votes to 
become effective. See JAMES, supra note 79, at 282–85. The Ohio legislature insisted that its prior 
ratification vote had been “a misrepresentation of the public sentiment of the people of Ohio, and 
contrary to the best interests of the white race, endangering the perpetuity of our free institutions.” 
64 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF OHIO, FIFTY-EIGHTH GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY 12 (Columbus, LD. Myers & Bro. 1868), quoted in JAMES, supra note 79, at 282. And the 
New Jersey Legislature worried that the Amendment, inter alia, imposed “new prohibitions upon the 
power of the state to pass laws, and interdicts the execution of such parts of the common law as the 
national Judiciary may esteem inconsistent with the vague provisions of the said amendment.” S.J. 
Res. 1, at 12–13 (N.J. 1868), available at http://www.nj.gov/state/archives/doc14thamendment.html, 
quoted in JAMES, supra note 79, at 2885. Oregon’s rescission vote came after the Fourteenth 
Amendment had already become effective, but the state legislature claimed to base its decision to 
rescind ratification in part on its conclusion that the Southern ratifications had been coerced and were 
therefore illegitimate. See JAMES, supra note 79, at 300; S.J. Res. 4, 5th Reg. Sess. (Or. 1868), 
reprinted in GENERAL LAWS OF THE STATE OF OREGON PASSED AT THE FIFTH REGULAR SESSION OF 
THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY THEREOF 111–15 (Salem, Oregon, W.A. McPherson 1868). Congress 
refused to accept any of these rescissions, as some members insisted that once a state votes to ratify an 
amendment, it may not change its mind, even if the amendment has not yet become effective. See 
JAMES, supra note 79, at 284, 287–88. (On the other hand, Congress had no problem allowing—indeed, 
forcing—the Southern states that initially voted not to ratify to change their minds. Cf. Editorial, Tragic 
Era Strategy, WASH. POST, June 7, 1939, at 10 (“Nor is it logical to permit State legislatures to change 
their action from negative to affirmative but not from affirmative to negative during the period when a 
constitutional change is an active issue.”).) There is a vigorous scholarly debate over the validity of a 
state’s attempt to rescind a prior ratification while an amendment is still pending. See, e.g., Peter 
Michael Jung, Note, Validity of a State’s Rescission of its Ratification of a Federal Constitutional 
Amendment, 2 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 233 (1979); cf. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939) 
(finding the question whether a state ratified an amendment to be a political question). John Harrison 
argues that these rescissions make little difference to the question of whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment is formally legitimate; if the Southern ratifications count, then the votes of these states are 
not needed, and if the Southern ratifications do not count, then the votes of these states are not enough. 
See Harrison, supra note 8, at 378 n.11. Still, these actions do seem relevant to the question of whether 
there really was a formally expressed supermajoritarian consensus in favor of the Fourteenth 
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dubious constitutional origin to begin with.169 The American people did not, 
in fact, coalesce around the mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment. There 
was no national170 supermajoritarian consensus in its favor. 
B. Nonpartisan, Deliberative Consensus? 
As noted above,171 some originalists have emphasized that a key 
benefit of originalism is that the Constitution’s supermajoritarian 
enactment and amendment requirements ensure that constitutional 
provisions will “not be based on partisan motivations.”172 Because 
constitutional provisions can “not generally be enacted unless they 
receive[] the support of significant portions of both parties,”173 the Framers 
of constitutional provisions will “focus on the interests citizens have in 
common rather than their parties’ narrow interests.”174 Accordingly, by 
following the original meaning of those provisions, judges will be 
enforcing the consensus views of the people about matters universally 
understood to be in the long-term collective interest of society as a 
 
Amendment. See Extending the Ratification Period for the Proposed Equal Rights Amendment: 
Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 638 Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 69–72, 78–81 (1977–1978) [hereinafter House Hearings] (testimony of 
Professor Charles L. Black, Jr., Yale Law School) (forcefully arguing that, where a state has voted to 
formally rescind its ratification, that state can no longer be counted in seeking to establish a national 
consensus). 
169 At the start of the Civil War, a breakaway, pro-Union province of Virginia declared itself to be 
the lawful government of Virginia, much to the chagrin of most actual Virginians, and then purported to 
give “Virginia’s” consent to the creation the new state of West Virginia, which was to occupy that same 
breakaway corner of Virginia and was to be governed by that same pro-Union government. See Vasan 
Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 291, 297–
301 (2002); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“New States may be admitted by the Congress into this 
Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State . . . without 
the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.”). There is an 
intriguing argument that, as a formalist matter, this process actually complied with the Constitution. See 
Kesavan & Paulsen, supra, at 332–95. But even if it did, the fact that one of the states that voted to 
ratify the Fourteenth Amendment was dubiously carved out of a corner of an existing state that despised 
the Amendment undermines the notion that the Amendment really enjoyed the supermajority support of 
three-fourths of the states. 
170 Georgia Governor Charles Jenkins railed against the sectional nature of the Amendment, 
complaining that it would “fall upon citizens inhabiting one latitude like an avalanche from its mountain 
perch, crushing where it settles; whilst upon those of another latitude it will alight unfelt like a feather 
floating in still air.” 4 THE CONFEDERATE RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, supra note 122, at 546, 
quoted in James, supra note 97, at 489. 
171 See supra Part I.C. 
172 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 62, at 1706. 
173 Id. at 1708. 
174 Id. 
107:1627 (2013) Originalism and Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment 
1657 
whole.175 It is for this reason that originalism is said to advance the public 
good.176 
Other originalists, who focus more on popular sovereignty than 
utilitarianism, have similarly emphasized that, to reflect the will of the 
people, the Constitution must be the product of fair and open deliberation 
between the majority and the minority.177 Whittington explains that: 
The majority cannot simply impose its will on the minority through strength, 
even if that power is only the strength of votes. Rather, the majority must open 
itself to the minority by engaging it in deliberation. Even if the minority is 
ultimately unconvinced and there remains disagreement when the final vote is 
taken, the minority has been accepted as internal to the whole and not as an 
alien element simply to be defeated. The process of constitutional formation 
cannot be guided by the slogan “to the victor go the spoils,” for genuine 
efforts at conversion and reconciliation are integral to the process of gaining 
political authority over those who are finally outvoted. The majority, 
therefore, must be willing to put the ultimate constitutional outcome in 
doubt.178 
“[F]or this reason, political factions are inconsistent with 
constitutional deliberation” and “party-line votes violate the basis for 
determining the sovereign will.”179 “In such instances, the sovereign will 
cannot be representative of the whole but is explicitly the rule of a partial 
society over the whole through the instrument of law.”180 
But the Fourteenth Amendment was as partisan as it gets. It was 
entirely the work of the Northern Republican Party. Southerners played no 
role at all in the framing process, save for a few committee witness 
appearances,181 and even Northern Democrats were essentially excluded 
from the process. “It was felt that the Democratic Party could not be 
entrusted with any part of the solution of the problem of reconstruction. . . . 
This sentiment was normal in 1865.”182 Indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment 
served as the de facto Republican Party campaign platform for the 1866 
 
175 Cf. WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 141 (“The fact that the constitution will be controlling not 
just today but also tomorrow directs the sovereign to consider those likely effects as well, pushing him 
toward a more universal perspective.”). 
176 See supra Part I.C. 
177 See supra Part I.A. 
178 WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 147. 
179 Id. 
180 Id.; see also id. at 145 (“[T]he sovereign gains his political authority by his claim to represent 
the whole of the people. The sovereign is not a partial entity, representing a single class or subunit of 
society against the rest but claims to encompass the whole.”). 
181 See James, supra note 97, at 479–80. 
182 COLLINS, supra note 90, at 2. 
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elections.183 And opinions about it were so divisive along party lines that 
one newspaper declared that “the feelings of the different portions of the 
country, are more embittered now, than they were while the conflict was 
raging.”184 
Far from receiving significant support from both parties, the 
Fourteenth Amendment was a purely Republican measure from start to 
finish.185 As James G. Blaine, a House Republican from Maine who soon 
assumed the role Speaker of the House, remembered it, the Fourteenth 
Amendment was “carried, from first to last, as a party measure—
unanimously supported by the Republicans, unanimously opposed by the 
Democrats.”186 “[T]he line of Democratic hostility in Nation and in State 
was absolutely unbroken”;187 the Amendment “failed to attract the vote of a 
single Democratic member in any State Legislature in the whole Union.”188 
Blaine observed that “[i]t is very seldom in the history of political issues, 
even when partisan feeling is most deeply developed, that so absolute a 
division is found as was recorded upon the question of adopting the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”189 
It bears repeating that this was not a situation in which one party was 
so popular throughout the nation that it was able to muster the necessary 
supermajority to enact its agenda over the wishes of the other party. That 
would still be partisanship, but at least it would be overwhelmingly popular 
partisanship. But that was not what happened here. Rather, this was a 
situation in which the dominant party’s agenda was not that universally 
popular, but was still forced upon the other party. The dominant party was 
not “willing to put the ultimate constitutional outcome in doubt.”190 To the 
contrary, it made clear through a show of military force that, no matter how 
strong the opposition, one way or another the Fourteenth Amendment was 
going to end up in the Constitution. 
What is more, the Fourteenth Amendment can be seen as the product 
of the basest sort of partisanship—seeking to advance political ends, rather 
 
183 See NELSON, supra note 112, at 58; id. (referring to the Amendment as “one of the best 
platforms our party can have to fight the copperheads at the coming elections” (quoting Letter from J.A. 
Chase to John Sherman (June 8, 1866))). 
184 Editorial, Radicalism, FRANK LESLIE’S ILLUSTRATED NEWSPAPER (N.Y.), Aug. 4, 1866, at 306, 
quoted in JAMES, supra note 79, at 47. 
185 See NELSON, supra note 112, at 113 (“The nation did, in fact, divide along party lines in its 
support of or opposition to the amendment, and, in that sense, the Democratic opponents of the 
amendment were correct about its partisan quality.”). 
186 2 JAMES G. BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS 309 (Norwich, Conn., The Henry Bill 
Publishing Co. 1886). 
187 Id. at 310; see also COLLINS, supra note 90, at 14 (noting that “Democrats everywhere with one 
voice raised the cry of protest and warning,” and that “the Democratic press was a unit against it”). 
188 2 BLAINE, supra note 186. 
189 Id. 
190 WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 147. 
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than policy ends. The Republicans were not simply trying to cram their 
policies down the throats of the Democrats; they were seeking to entrench 
their party’s political power at the expense of the Democrats. Democrats 
charged that the Amendment was “designed solely to perpetuate party 
ascendancy, not to subserve the public good.”191 They lamented that “the 
Government is to be revolutionized to secure the ascendency of the 
Republican party.”192 Democrats saw the Amendment as the product of “the 
law of party necessity,” designed to secure to Republicans “the continuance 
of power, its offices and rich spoils.”193 As one newspaper put it, it was a 
scheme “[t]o fix . . . power in the line of perpetuity, so as to . . . serve the 
selfish purposes of present possessors” in accordance with “the wishes and 
sentiments of the temporary majority of a section of the Union.”194  
These were not simply sour grapes. There was substantial truth to what 
the Democrats said. “One of the immediate purposes of the adoption of the 
Amendment was to assist in destroying the power of the Democratic Party 
in the South and in its place to build up Republicans.”195 It was designed to 
“more firmly establish and maintain the control of the Government by the 
Republican Party.”196 “This party purpose was made no secret.”197 As one 
Republican explained, he had “a holy hatred” for the Democrats and was 
“willing to sacrifice almost anything to keep the democratic party out of 
power.”198  
Now it is surely true that the Republicans had powerful reasons for 
seeking to entrench their political power—reasons that resonate strongly 
with us today on moral grounds. The Republicans had come to recognize 
that the recently enacted Thirteenth Amendment had unintended, perverse 
effects. By freeing the slaves, the Thirteenth Amendment immediately 
increased the political power of the Southern states in the Congress. Recall 
that, under the three-fifths compromise in the original Constitution, 
representation in the House of Representatives and the Electoral College 
was apportioned according to population, with slaves counting as only 
 
191 Editorial, The Howard Constitutional Amendment, SEMI-WKLY. FLORIDIAN (Tallahassee), Oct. 
2, 1866, at 2, quoted in BOND, supra note 79, at 172. 
192 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 426 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Eldridge (D–WI)). 
193 Id. app. 238 (remarks of Sen. Davis (D–KY)). 
194 Editorial, Proposed Changes in the Constitution, LITTLE ROCK DAILY GAZETTE, Dec. 28, 1865, 
at 1, quoted in NELSON, supra note 112, at 95; see also Editorial, The Only Issue, DAILY EXAMINER 
(S.F.), May 4, 1866, at 2, quoted in NELSON, supra note 112, at 109 (arguing that the Amendment 
would “convert the government into a mere party engine, to be wielded, not for the good of the people, 
but to suit the whims, passions, prejudices, interests and aggrandizement of a successful party”). 
195 COLLINS, supra note 90, at 11. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Letter from A.L. Brewer to John Sherman (Dec. 28, 1865) (original in the Papers of John 
Sherman 1846–1893, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.) (copy on file with author), quoted in 
NELSON, supra note 112, at 46. 
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three-fifths of a person.199 Now that all of the slaves had been freed, the 
former slave states suddenly had significantly more proportional 
representation in the federal government—enough power to potentially 
seize the upper hand. Yet the Democrats who controlled those states were 
vehemently opposed to civil rights, racial equality, and suffrage rights for 
African Americans. And they had enacted the notorious “black codes” that 
ensured that the freed slaves would have few rights, and no political 
strength.200 As such, the Thirteenth Amendment ended up just giving more 
political power to Southern whites.201 The Republicans feared that, if this 
were to result in the racist Democrats regaining control of the federal 
government, the Civil War would have been fought for naught. “More 
appeared at stake than partisan control of the apparatus of government; the 
stake which the Republicans perceived—the stake for which 364,511 
Union troops had lost their lives—was the future of liberty in the United 
States and, perhaps, in the world.”202 
But, of course, political parties virtually always believe that their 
obtaining or maintaining political power is essential for the good of the 
country—that the other party’s policies are so dangerously un-American 
that freedom and security will suffer tremendously should the other party 
gain the upper hand.203 And in any event, however noble we find the 
Republicans’ aims, and however much we might agree with their 
 
199 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, partly repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 
(“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be 
included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding 
to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and 
excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.”); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall 
appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole 
Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . .”). 
200 See Harrison, supra note 8, at 401. 
201 See id. at 400–01 (“As free people the former slaves would count as whole persons for 
apportionment, not as three-fifths. They remained disenfranchised, however, so rather than having a 
voice of their own they amplified that of their former masters.” (footnote omitted)). 
202 NELSON, supra note 112, at 46 (footnote omitted). 
203 For current examples, see, for instance, Devin Dwyer, Obama Warns Women that Romney, 
GOP Will “Close Doors of Opportunity,” ABC NEWS BLOGS (Apr. 27, 2012, 7:09 PM), http://abcnews.
go.com/blogs/politics/2012/04/obama-warns-women-that-romney-gop-will-close-doors-of-opportunity, 
which notes that “President Obama warned women voters today that Republicans in Congress and 
presumptive GOP presidential nominee Mitt Romney want to ‘close doors of opportunity we thought 
we’d kicked open a long time ago’”; Emily Friedman, Iran Will Have Nukes if Obama Is Re-Elected, 
Romney Says, ABC NEWS BLOGS (Mar. 4, 2012, 4:06 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/
2012/03/iran-will-have-nukes-if-obama-is-re-elected-romney-says, quoting Mitt Romney’s claim that 
“[i]f Barack Obama gets re-elected, Iran will have a nuclear weapon and the world will change if that’s 
the case”; and Serafin Gomez, Romney: If Obama Reelected U.S. Will Have a “Greece-Like” Crisis, 
FOX NEWS BLOGS (Dec. 19, 2011), http://politics.blogs.foxnews.com/2011/12/19/romney-if-obama-re-
elected-us-will-have-greece-crisis, quoting Mitt Romney as saying, “I think before the end of his second 
term, if he were reelected, there’s a very high risk that we would hit a financial crisis that Greece or 
Italy have faced.” 
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assessment of the stakes, the fact remains that their proposed Amendment 
was a partisan measure through and through—seeking to perpetuate the 
power of the dominant party204—and the controversial principles upon 
which it was based were manifestly not embraced by the minority party.205 
Nor was the minority party willing to accept the legitimacy of either 
the amending process or the final result. Keith Whittington has emphasized 
that a key component of the original Constitution’s claim to reflect the 
sovereign will of the people is that the Anti-Federalist minority, despite 
losing the debate, was willing to accept both the constitution-making 
process and the ultimate outcome.206 That was essential, because the 
“continued rejection of the general law by the minority indicates that there 
is in fact no common society between the majority and minority; they do 
not form a single people and therefore possess no common sovereign.”207 
Yet that is exactly what happened with the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
Democrats repeatedly and vociferously objected to the process by which 
the Amendment was carried in a rump Congress and then forced upon the 
South,208 and they refused to accept the validity of the Amendment even 
after it had been declared effective.209 
 
204 See The Passage of the Reconstruction Amendment, CHI. TRIB., June 20, 1866, at 2, quoted in 
JAMES, supra note 79, at 170 (recounting the concern among legislators “that the amendment is the 
cunning headwork of politicians, providing for the present, rather than building up, regardless of 
considerations of expediency, a sure foundation for the lasting internal peace and prosperity of the 
Republic”); Editorial, The Constitutional Amendment, a Proposition of Pains, Penalties, and Not of 
Repose, CHARLESTON DAILY COURIER, Oct. 19, 1866, at 2, quoted in BOND, supra note 79, at 122 
(“The moment any party succeeds in incorporating into the written charter of right, and common 
compact of protection, and privilege, its platform based upon the temporary passions of the hour, the 
fall of free government is sealed.”). 
205 See COLLINS, supra note 90, at 12 (“The opposition of the Democratic Party to the adoption of 
the Fourteenth Amendment was something more than a fight for self-preservation. It was a struggle to 
maintain the time-honored principles upon which that party was founded. The Democratic Party had 
always stood for local government where only local interests were involved. It had worked on the 
theory that the Federal Government possessed and should possess only delegated powers—that its 
sphere of activity was circumscribed by definite limitations.”); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 
2538 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Rogers (D–NJ)) (“[The Fourteenth Amendment] saps the foundation of 
the Government; it destroys the elementary principles of the States; it consolidates everything into one 
imperial despotism; it annihilates all the rights which lie at the foundation of the Union of the States, 
and which have characterized this Government and made it prosperous and great during the long period 
of its existence. . . . It will result in a revolution worse than that through which we have just passed.”). 
206 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 146–47. 
207 Id. at 146. 
208 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1969 (1967) (veto message of President Andrew 
Johnson), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=72072 (“The military rule 
which it establishes is plainly to be used, not for any purpose of order or for the prevention of crime, but 
solely as a means of coercing the people into the adoption of principles and measures to which it is 
known that they are opposed, and upon which they have an undeniable right to exercise their own 
judgment.”); NELSON, supra note 112 (noting objections to the procedure used in Congress). 
209 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1252 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Morton (R–IN)) 
(asserting that “the Democratic party . . . has . . . declared . . . that the fourteenth and fifteenth 
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III. IMPLICATIONS AND OBJECTIONS 
There are ample reasons to question the general strength of the popular 
normative justifications for originalism. Indeed, many critics have already 
done so quite effectively.210 To briefly hit on some of the highlights, 
justifying originalism on the basis of popular sovereignty or social contract 
rings a bit hollow when one considers the fact that the people who actually 
consented to the ratification of the Constitution are all long dead. As Gary 
Lawson puts it, arguments for an originalist interpretation of the 
Constitution “cannot rely on its past ratification . . . . There is simply no 
way to bridge the gap between A’s acceptance and B’s obligation. Past 
majorities cannot bind present individuals.”211 Indeed, Daniel Farber argues 
that: 
 
amendments are nullities, and will be by them disregarded when they come into power”; noting that the 
House Democrats unanimously voted against a July 11, 1870 resolution declaring the Fourteenth 
Amendment to be valid; and asserting that “no Democratic convention, Legislature, or leading 
statesman, so far as I know, has accepted or admitted the validity of the amendments”); Chin & 
Abraham, supra note 168, at 33 (noting that, “[i]n 1959, the United States Commission on Civil Rights 
reported on ‘the great stubborn fact that many people have not yet accepted the principles, purposes or 
authority of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments’” (quoting Excerpts from Report and 
Recommendations of Commission on Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1959, at 44 (Late City 
Edition))); J. RES. OF THE GEORGIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY 45 (S. RES. No. 39), at 348, 350 (Ga. 1957), 
available at http://georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/1957resn-7.htm (urging Congress “to enact such 
legislation as they may deem fit to declare that the 14th and 15th amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States were never validly adopted and that they are null and void and of no effect,” and 
declaring that “the continued recognition of the 14th and 15th Amendments as valid parts of the 
Constitution of the United States is incompatible with the present day position of the United States as 
the World’s champion of Constitutional governments resting upon the consent of the people given 
through their lawful representatives”). But see The Platform, in OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION, HELD AT BALTIMORE, JULY 9, 1872, at 40 (Boston, Rockwell & 
Churchill 1872), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29580 (“We pledge 
ourselves to maintain the union of these States, emancipation and enfranchisement; and to oppose any 
reopening of the questions settled by the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the 
Constitution.”). 
210 See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 69–75 (2009) 
(criticizing the popular sovereignty defense of originalism); Ethan J. Leib, Why Supermajoritarianism 
Does Not Illuminate the Interpretive Debate Between Originalists and Non-Originalists, 101 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1905 (2007) (criticizing the supermajoritarian defense of originalism); Paul Lermack, The 
Constitution Is the Social Contract so It Must Be a Contract . . . Right? A Critique of Originalism as 
Interpretive Method, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1403, 1425–43 (2007) (criticizing the contract-based 
defense of originalism); Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 
108 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 655–60 (2008) (criticizing the social contract defense of originalism); Larry 
G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be 
Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1482, 1496–505 (1985) (criticizing the social contract defense of 
originalism); Tara Smith, Originalism’s Misplaced Fidelity: “Original” Meaning Is Not Objective, 
26 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 13–25 (2009) (criticizing the popular sovereignty defense of originalism); 
Stein, supra note 5, at 406–33 (criticizing the popular sovereignty and supermajoritarian defenses of 
originalism). 
211 Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1835 (1997); see 
also RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 11 (2004) (“Anything less than 
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[I]n seeking a majoritarian source of legitimacy, we perhaps should look not 
to the vote of the [Framers] but rather to the popular support of the 
Constitution today. Since most people are not historians, that popular support 
may be based on the current legal understanding of the Constitution rather 
than on its original understanding.212 
In addition, popular sovereignty, supermajoritarian, and contractarian 
defenses of originalism all must grapple with the highly inconvenient fact 
that, even at the time of the framing, the vast majority of the American 
people did not have a say in the ratification of the Constitution. “Among 
those excluded from the franchise were women, African-American slaves, 
almost all Native Americans, and many poor white [and free black] males, 
who were excluded by property qualifications and poll taxes.”213 As Larry 
Simon—who has calculated that only about 2.5% of the population actually 
voted in favor of ratification214—explains, the “Constitution was adopted by 
propertied, white males who had no strong incentives to attend to the 
concerns and interests of the impoverished, the nonwhites, or nonmales 
who were alive then, much less those of us alive today who hold 
conceptions of our interests and selves very different from the ones held by 
those in the original clique.”215 On top of all this, consent-based 
justifications must come to terms with the fact that, in reality, the ratifying 
public did not actually understand the Constitution.216 Indeed, the 
provisions of the Constitution that touch upon controversial subjects were 
ratified only because, rather than having a universally understood and 
collectively endorsed meaning, they were drafted with ambiguous language 
that meant very different things to different people.217 
These various critiques are well-known, and it is not my purpose here 
to recount or analyze them in any detail. My point is instead to suggest that, 
 
unanimous consent simply cannot bind nonconsenting persons.”); id. at 11–31 (developing this 
argument); Farber, supra note 24, at 1099 (“[T]he ratifiers had no claim at all to represent those of us 
alive today, so it is unclear how their majority vote can override the will of current majorities: ‘We did 
not adopt the Constitution, and those who did are dead and gone.’” (quoting Paul Brest, The 
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 225 (1980))). 
212 Farber, supra note 24, at 1099; see also Berman, supra note 210, at 73 (arguing that if the 
public now supports a particular constitutional meaning, then notions of popular sovereignty suggest 
that courts should follow that meaning, not the original one). 
213 Stein, supra note 5, at 398 & n.5 (footnote omitted); see also BARNETT, supra note 211, at 20 
(“Though voting requirements varied with local jurisdictions, in no place could women, children, 
indentured servants, or slaves vote. Moreover, it was not uncommon to have a property requirement that 
limited the voting rights of white males and free black males.”). 
214 See Simon, supra note 210, at 1498 n.44. 
215 Id. at 1499–500. 
216 See Ilya Somin, Originalism and Political Ignorance, 97 MINN. L. REV. 625, 629, 642–47 
(2012) (arguing that the American people likely had very little understanding of the meaning of the 
Constitution and its amendments, and therefore did not knowingly endorse or acquiesce in them). 
217 See Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage Amendment and the False Promise of 
Originalism, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 529, 586–99 (2008). 
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however bruised the normative case for originalism may be as a result of 
these critiques, the normative case is substantially weaker when it comes to 
the Fourteenth Amendment than it is for the rest of the Constitution. The 
Fourteenth Amendment is sui generis,218 and when it comes to its 
interpretation, normative defenses of originalism are subject to unique 
objections that go well above and beyond the universal objections just 
noted. 
Originalists have potential answers to the general critiques of their 
normative case. In response to the argument that a popular sovereignty 
defense is untenable because the current generation cannot be bound by the 
dead hand of its ancestors, originalists often argue, for instance, that 
because the people retain the authority to amend the Constitution today, 
their failure to exercise that authority amounts to tacit consent to the 
decisions of their forefathers.219 And in response to the concern that the 
Framers may not really have understood or agreed about what they were 
signing on to, originalists often argue that the people can fairly be held to 
have assented to the objective meaning of the constitutional text that they 
ratified, regardless of their subjective understandings.220 And in response to 
the concern that many people at the time of the framing were not permitted 
to have their voices heard,221 originalists can argue that subsequent 
amendments have made up for the initial democratic deficiencies,222 or that 
most of the excluded persons probably would have agreed with the persons 
who did get to vote.223 
One can certainly question the efficacy of these and other originalist 
responses.224 But whatever we think of these arguments, the point here is 
 
218 Actually, the other Reconstruction Amendments may also be susceptible to some of the 
objections raised here, but this Article does not address them. 
219 See Paulsen, supra note 19, at 696 (arguing that “the First Amendment remains valid, and 
consistent with popular sovereignty . . . because it has not been repealed by the recognized mechanisms 
for expressing so fundamental a change in the sovereign will of the People”); Richard A. Primus, When 
Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 195–97 (2008) (discussing this response 
and rejoinders to it). 
220 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. 
L. REV. 1, 7–9 (2011). 
221 Actually, for the most part, “defenses of originalism have . . . failed to address . . . the exclusion 
of African-Americans and women from the constitutional enactment process.” McGinnis & Rappaport, 
supra note 62, at 1697; see also id. at 1697 n.4 (“[W]e cannot think of any extended analysis of these 
matters by [another] originalist.”). 
222 See id. at 1757–64 (arguing that the Reconstruction Amendments and the Nineteenth 
Amendment largely correct for the initial failure to allow women and most African Americans to 
participate in the ratification of the Constitution). 
223 See id. at 1763 n.228 (“The close connection between women and male relatives may mean that 
women’s suffrage at the time of ratification would not have made a large difference.”); McGinnis & 
Rappaport, supra note 63, at 396 n.55 (arguing that there is no “strong evidence” that “the Constitution 
would have been systematically different” had “women and African-Americans” been included in the 
framing process). 
224 For my part, I will confess to finding them wholly unsatisfactory. 
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that the Fourteenth Amendment opens a whole different kettle of fish. It 
presents a problem that cannot be addressed with the usual responses. The 
concern with the Fourteenth Amendment is not (just) that modern views 
may differ from those of the framing generation, or that many of the 
Framers may not have known what they were getting themselves (and us) 
into, or that we cannot be certain whether some members of the framing 
generation who were excluded from the decisionmaking process would 
have agreed with the end result. The unique concern with the Fourteenth 
Amendment is that, at the time of its enactment, a very sizable portion of 
the American people—enough to defeat the Constitution’s supermajority 
requirements—with a clear understanding (at least in general terms) of 
what the Amendment set out to accomplish, expressly and vehemently 
disagreed with it, and yet were forced to ratify it against their will.225 
If originalism is justified because the provisions of the Constitution 
were voluntarily adopted by a supermajority of the American people, in 
whom all sovereignty is vested,226 or because supermajoritarianism 
produces better laws,227 then what warrant is there for insisting on an 
originalist interpretation of a provision that openly failed to obtain the 
support of a supermajority of the people? And if originalism is justified 
because the Constitution is a contract among the people,228 then what 
warrant is there for insisting on an originalist interpretation of a provision 
to which the people ultimately agreed only involuntarily, under severe 
duress?229 
 
225 See, e.g., J.G. RANDALL & DAVID DONALD, THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 634 (2d 
ed. 1969) (“In reality Congress in 1867–1868 was not merely submitting an amendment to the states. It 
was creating fabricated governments in the South, to which there was given not an untrammeled 
opportunity of voting Yes or No on the proposed constitutional article, but only the alternative of voting 
Yes or being denied recognition as states in the Union.”); Jason Mazzone, Unamendments, 90 IOWA L. 
REV. 1747, 1807 (2005) (“Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment came about through plain 
coercion.”). 
226 See supra Part I.A. 
227 See supra Part I.C. 
228 See supra Part I.B. 
229 Arguably, the circumstances in which the Southern states were placed do not technically qualify 
as “duress” under the law of contract, especially as it existed at the time. See Harrison, supra note 8, at 
419, 452 (suggesting this possibility). That point is certainly debatable. See id. at 419 (noting that in 
“the nineteenth century there was good authority for the proposition that a contract was invalid because 
of duress . . . if major violence was used or threatened”); 1 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS 395 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 5th ed. 1866) (declaring that a threat renders a contract 
voidable if it “was of sufficient importance to destroy the threatened party’s freedom”); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981) (“If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an improper 
threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the 
victim.”). But, in any event, the contract metaphor is just that—a metaphor. I am not aware of any 
originalist who believes that the Constitution is subject in every respect to all of the particulars of 
contract law. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 211, at 100 (arguing that, while many aspects of contract 
law theory are relevant to constitutional interpretation, the Constitution should not be treated “as a 
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Even if we accept (as virtually everyone does) that the Fourteenth 
Amendment is lawfully part of the Constitution today, despite its dubious 
origins, we cannot deny that there were irregularities, to put it mildly, in its 
enactment and ratification.230 Those irregularities render the normative case 
for originalism much less compelling—perhaps even devastated—when 
applied to the Fourteenth Amendment, the very constitutional provision 
“that most concern[s] originalists who worry about judicial activism.”231 
Originalists have ignored this problem altogether.232 What follows is 
an analysis of possible responses available to them. Part III.A considers 
arguments that could be made to try to contest or get around the lack of a 
supermajoritarian consensus. If those arguments fail, Part III.B considers 
ways in which originalists might seek to come to terms with the 
inapplicability of their normative arguments to the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A. Possible Counterarguments 
One suspects that originalists would not be quick to concede that the 
normative arguments for originalism are incompatible with the ratification 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. This section considers, and ultimately 
rejects, a number of arguments that originalists might advance to contest or 
dodge this claim. 
1. The Fourteenth Amendment Did, in Fact, Receive the Necessary 
Supermajoritarian Support.—To begin with, there are several 
arguments that originalists could offer in support of a claim that, despite the 
history recounted above, the Fourteenth Amendment actually did garner the 
support of a supermajority of the people. 
a. It was the later ratification votes, not the earlier rejection 
votes, that were the true expression of the will of the majority 
of the Southern people.—Originalists might argue that the 
initial votes by the Southern state legislatures to reject the Fourteenth 
Amendment were not truly representative of the actual views of a majority 
of the Southern people, because those all-white legislatures were not 
elected by the population as a whole. Indeed, the argument might go, when 
Congress mandated the election of new state governments under the 
Reconstruction Acts, those governments, elected through universal suffrage 
(or universal male suffrage, anyway), were truly representative in a way 
 
contract in a literal sense”). The bottom line is that the social contract metaphor breaks down if the 
“contract” was coerced and the people did not agree to its terms. 
230 See Harrison, supra note 8, at 409 (arguing that the Amendment was formally valid, but 
acknowledging that the “process . . . was, to say the least, extraordinary”). 
231 Colby, supra note 217, at 598. 
232 The minor exception here is McGinnis and Rappaport, who have addressed this issue, but only 
in a footnote. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 62, at 1727 n.83. Their analysis is discussed 
below in Parts III.A.3 and III.A.4. 
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that the earlier white supremacist governments had never been.233 When 
those new inclusive governments voted to ratify the Fourteenth 
Amendment, that was a formal expression of the true views of a majority of 
the Southern people; in combination, blacks, free for the first time to vote, 
and liberal whites outnumbered the racist white minority that had 
previously controlled the state legislatures. Accordingly, the argument 
would go, the Fourteenth Amendment really did receive the formal consent 
of the people of three-fourths of the states, just as soon as more of those 
people were given a voice in the process. Whatever federalism concerns we 
might have with the federal Congress forcibly remaking state governments 
(and perhaps we should not have any after the Civil War), we should not 
have any popular sovereignty concerns with the decision of those remade 
state governments to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. Unlike the older 
racist governments, those new state governments actually represented the 
true wishes of the people. 
This would be a tidy response. But unfortunately, it does not work. For 
one thing, the new state governments were not elected through universal 
male suffrage. The Reconstruction Act expressly allowed for the 
disenfranchisement of voters “for participation in the rebellion.”234 
Although the extent of the phenomenon has often been overstated,235 there 
was in fact significant disenfranchisement of white voters who had 
supported or been active in the rebellion.236 As such—even leaving aside 
the lack of women’s suffrage—the new state governments were not elected 
through a truly representative process either. They just replaced one 
(morally reprehensible) form of disenfranchisement with another (morally 
understandable) one. 
In addition, even beyond the effects of disenfranchisement, the new 
state governments ended up comprised of representatives who were 
disproportionately willing to vote for the Fourteenth Amendment. By the 
time the new governments were elected, conservative whites were 
humiliated and defiant, and many chose not to vote, whether as a form of 
protest, as a racist refusal to share a voting booth with blacks, or as a 
 
233 Cf. Michael Kent Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment: Recalling What the Court Forgot, 
56 DRAKE L. REV. 911, 1004 (2008) (“The new Southern state constitutions established a much more 
democratic electorate. As a result, the new legislatures that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment came 
from a far more democratic system than the legislatures they replaced. From the perspective of a 
modern democratic understanding of popular sovereignty, the ratification was more, not less, 
acceptable.”). 
234 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429. 
235 See Forrest G. Wood, On Revising Reconstruction History: Negro Suffrage, White 
Disenfranchisement, and Common Sense, 51 J. NEGRO HIST. 98, 104–08 (1966). For an example, see 
McElwee, supra note 7, at 491, 500, 503. 
236 See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 323–
24 (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1st Perennial Classics 2002) (1988); Wood, 
supra note 235, at 105–07. 
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reflection of profound disillusionment.237 Once the military occupation of 
Radical Reconstruction had begun, it became obvious to white voters that 
Congress would ultimately ensure, whether through additional massive 
white disenfranchisement or otherwise, that the South would ratify the 
Fourteenth Amendment. There was no point in bothering to vote, and so 
many of them did not.238 In other words, it was only because of the coercive 
military occupation—and because the North had made clear that it would 
dictate the ultimate outcome no matter what—that most of the new 
Southern state legislatures ended up firmly in the hands of the liberal, 
Republican minority. 
Finally, it must not be forgotten that these new, disproportionately 
Unionist state governments acted at gunpoint. They had been given no 
choice but to ratify, and it is impossible to say with any confidence that 
their ratification votes were voluntary.239 Indeed, the history discussed 
above strongly suggests that they were not.240 As one additional data point, 
consider the fact that the new Georgia legislature was still riddled with 
enough racist bile to expel the duly elected black representatives.241 One 
can surely question whether a legislature like that would have ratified the 
Fourteenth Amendment in the absence of federal coercion.242 
b. Even though the Southern ratification votes were not 
voluntary, there really was majority support for the 
Amendment in the Southern states.—A second possible 
rejoinder is related to the previous one. Originalists might argue that, even 
if the actual ratification process in the South was flawed and not truly the 
product of voluntary choice, the fact remains that a majority of the 
 
237 See Wood, supra note 235, at 108–10; JAMES, supra note 79, at 214. 
238 See Wood, supra note 235, at 110 (“It must have been quite obvious from the beginning that the 
Radicals were going to have things their way; and that the establishment of military districts indicated 
that they were going to depend on federal bayonets, not Negro voters. Had southern whites turned out in 
force, it is probable that the Radicals would have resorted to the most obvious expedient: simply secure 
the disenfranchisement of more whites. This probability may have discouraged many from even 
bothering to make the trek to the registration office.”). 
239 Cf. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 198 (“Keep in mind that ‘the South’ placed under 
unconventional threat” of “indefinitely extended military occupation unless they ratified [Congress’s] 
constitutional initiative” was “not the lily-white South, but the newly minted governments of black and 
white voters after their constitutions had been certified as complying fully with the requirements of 
Republican government.”). But see Harrison, supra note 8, at 452 (arguing that the threat of continued 
nonrepresentation in Congress until the Amendment was ratified was probably unnecessary, as 
“Congress had done the real work when it brought about the creation of [the new] state governments”). 
240 See supra notes 158–65 and accompanying text. 
241 See FONER, supra note 236, at 346–47. 
242 Georgia’s Provisional Governor informed the legislature that, by Act of Congress, “you are 
required to duly ratify the amendment to the Constitution proposed by the 39th Congress, and known as 
Article 14 . . . before the State shall be entitled and admitted to representation in Congress as a State of 
the Union.” JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 49 (1868) 
(emphasis added). 
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Southern people really did support the Fourteenth Amendment. Because 
freed slaves and Unionists combined to outnumber conservatives, the 
argument would go, if there had been a fair ratification process with 
universal suffrage in the South, the Amendment would have been ratified. 
Yes, the actual process was faulty, but in a sense: no harm, no foul. 
Because the Southern people actually did support it, the Amendment still 
represents their sovereign will. 
There are two problems with this argument. First, it is likely 
empirically wrong. Blacks were a majority in only two or three Southern 
states.243 In some other Southern states, they comprised only about a quarter 
or a third of the population.244 Virulent racism and a rabid obsession with 
states’ rights ran very deep in the Southern white population,245 and it 
appears that only a negligible percentage of Southern whites supported the 
Amendment on its merits.246 
Second, in any event, “would have voted for the Amendment” is not 
the same thing as “did vote for the Amendment.” Relying on what the 
people likely would have done, rather than what the people in fact did do, 
is profoundly informal, and profoundly nonoriginalist. As Keith 
Whittington has emphasized, “originalism insists on the reality of consent” 
and “abandon[s] the notion of tacit or hypothetical consent.”247 
“[O]riginalism insists that consent cannot be assumed but must be obtained 
from those people who will be subjected to government power.”248 Joel 
Alicea explains that, for an originalist, the fact that polls show that the 
people overwhelming support a particular proposition is irrelevant, for 
constitutional purposes, unless the Constitution is formally amended 
(voluntarily). Only then can we say that “there exists a genuine and 
 
243 See AMAR, supra note 17, at 374 (noting that only South Carolina and Mississippi had black 
majorities); Chin & Abraham, supra note 168, at 41 n.105 (“At least in Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
South Carolina, where African-Americans were a majority of the population, there is no reason to doubt 
the majoritarian nature and popular support for the amendment[].”). 
244 See Wood, supra note 235, at 99. 
245 See supra Part II.A.1. 
246 See BOND, supra note 79, at 125 (noting that “[v]irtually all white South Carolinians,” even the 
Unionists, opposed black suffrage, and opposed the Amendment because it seemed to impose it); id. at 
101 & 114 n.7 (noting that, at the time of the first ratification vote in the Alabama legislature, the 
legislature was dominated by Unionists, rather than secessionists, but it still overwhelmingly rejected 
the Amendment); id. at 173 & 185 n.36 (“So universal was the white opposition to the amendment that 
one Florida editor declared in mid-November, just four days before the legislature met: ‘Having seen no 
evidence of favor to the Constitutional amendment from any respectable quarter in the South, we have 
felt no disposition to discuss its merits.’” (quoting The Constitutional Amendment, ST. AUGUSTINE 
EXAMINER, Nov. 10, 1866, at 2)); Wood, supra note 235, at 108–10 (suggesting that it was only 
because conservative whites largely abandoned the political process that the new Southern governments 
were able to ratify the Amendment); see also supra Part II (discussing the lack of consensus in the 
proposal and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
247 WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 156. 
248 Id. at 157. 
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overwhelming national consensus that has emerged after a lengthy period 
of reasoned public discourse.”249 The idea “that popular sovereignty can be 
exercised without any formal participation by the people in constitutional 
development”250—that popular opinion can be relied upon to justify a 
change in the content or meaning of the Constitution in the absence of 
actual consensual ratification—is a “nonoriginalist approach to popular 
sovereignty”251 that “runs counter to an originalist notion of what popular 
sovereignty means.”252 
c. Even though the Amendment did not win the voluntary 
support of a majority of Southerners, it was still supported by 
a significant majority of Americans, and thus represents the 
popular will of the American people as a whole.—Bruce 
Ackerman has argued that, even though the enactment of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not (in his opinion) satisfy the strict requirements of 
Article V, the Republican landslide victories in the 1866 and 1868 elections 
showed that a significant majority (though not a supermajority) of the 
American people as a whole (though perhaps not of Southerners) approved 
of the Amendment.253 These and related historical events—including the 
impeachment of President Johnson and his response to it—demonstrate that 
the Fourteenth Amendment was the product of its own sort of higher 
lawmaking, and was thus a legitimate act of popular sovereignty, 
notwithstanding its failure to comply with Article V.254 
Some originalists might be tempted by this argument—more so than 
by the previous one—as Ackerman’s claim at least relies on actual 
elections as formal indicia of popular support. If constitutional authority 
comes from the consent of the people, then perhaps formal and informal 
acts of the people that evince that consent—such as a national election that 
 
249 Alicea, supra note 21, at 107–08. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 15, at 527–28 
(Alexander Hamilton) (“Until the people have by some solemn and authoritative act annulled or 
changed the established form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no 
presumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a departure 
from it, prior to such an act.”). 
250 Alicea, supra note 21, at 105. 
251 Id. 
252 Id. at 111. 
253 See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 178–238. 
254 See id. Of course, Ackerman’s view is far more nuanced than the text suggests. He opines that, 
notwithstanding the irregularities in its enactment, the Fourteenth Amendment was not “an outrageous 
case of textualist rupture and sectional imposition,” id. at 184, because the South actively participated in 
the constitutional conversation. Id. at 183. And he believes that, ultimately, the South (along with 
President Johnson and the Supreme Court) backed down, albeit reluctantly, and acquiesced in the 
higher lawmaking pretensions of the Republican Congress. See Ackerman, supra note 145, at 506–07. 
107:1627 (2013) Originalism and Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment 
1671 
was widely understood at the time to be “a referendum on the Fourteenth 
Amendment”255—should be enough to legitimate constitutional change. 
Tempted as they might be, one suspects that few originalists would be 
willing to go along with Ackerman here. Ackerman’s emphasis on popular 
sovereignty and historical consent makes him something of a fellow 
traveler on the originalist train.256 But originalists typically bristle at 
Ackerman’s assertion that the people can change the meaning or content of 
the Constitution through unconventional means—that it is legitimate for 
constitutional change to come through transformative constitutional 
moments outside of the Article V amendment process.257 That belief is 
anathema to most originalists.258 Michael Dorf explains that “[t]his 
difference is fundamental. From the strict originalist’s perspective, the 
notion that the Constitution can be amended without complying with the 
Article V procedures is radically destabilizing” because it “robs the 
Constitution of its positivist character.”259 
Ackerman’s elegant theory is historically based popular sovereignty 
without originalism. Originalists use popular sovereignty as a justification 
for insisting that we follow the original meaning of the constitutional 
text.260 Ackerman uses popular sovereignty as a justification for overriding 
 
255 Michael Kent Curtis, The Klan, the Congress, and the Court: Congressional Enforcement of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments & the State Action Syllogism, a Brief Historical Overview, 
11.5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1381, 1396 (2009) (discussing the 1866 election); see also FONER, supra note 
236, at 267 (“More than anything else, the [1866] election became a referendum on the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Seldom, declared the New York Times, had a political contest been conducted ‘with so 
exclusive reference to a single issue.’” (quoting Editorial, The People’s Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 
1866, at 4)). 
256 See Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
923, 932 (2009) (“[E]ven if Ackerman . . . do[es] not describe [his] views as originalist, it is clear that 
[his] approach[] to the Constitution, which emphasize[s] popular sovereignty and the constitutional text, 
ha[s] had both direct and indirect influences over contemporary theoretical debates explicitly concerned 
with originalism.”). Thus, many commentators, including some originalists, have labeled Ackerman as 
an originalist of sorts. See, e.g., Lash, supra note 12, at 1440 n.6 (claiming that Ackerman “advocat[es] 
originalism under the theory of popular sovereignty”); Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 918, 933 (1992) (book review) (“Ackerman’s theory is merely originalism flying 
under liberal colors.”). 
257 See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 211, at 108–09 (rejecting Ackerman’s constitutional theory for 
this reason); BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 25, at 215 (same); Raoul Berger, Bruce 
Ackerman on Interpretation: A Critique, 1992 BYU L. REV. 1035 (1992) (book review) (same). 
258 See Stein, supra note 5, at 409 (arguing that Ackerman “is not actually an originalist,” because, 
while “his eloquent exposition of the concept of popular sovereignty can be relied upon by originalists 
of a more traditional bent,” his “insistence that the Constitution can be amended, and has been 
amended, outside the Article V process” is a “departure from originalism”). 
259 Dorf, supra note 56, at 1780; see also Sherry, supra note 256, at 928 (“Like the originalists, 
Ackerman insists that we are bound by the past, but he agrees with non-originalists that constitutional 
change can occur without formal amendments.”). 
260 See supra Part I.A. See generally Thomas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity 
Constraint on the Commerce Power, 91 VA. L. REV. 249, 302–08 (2005) (discussing the heavy 
emphasis that modern originalists place on the constitutional text); Randy E. Barnett, Underlying 
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the original meaning of the constitutional text. He would allow for 
constitutional change through the expressed will of the people, even in the 
absence of either supermajoritarian support261 or the approval of three-
fourths of the individual states.262 To an originalist, on the other hand, the 
Constitution can be changed when the people collectively act to change it, 
but the people must act in compliance with the original meaning of 
Article V—the constitutional text that dictates the procedures for 
effectuating constitutional change. Article V unequivocally requires 
supermajoritarianism and state-by-state ratification, and it seems clearly to 
contemplate no other legitimate means of constitutional amendment.263 
Indeed, much of the rhetoric of originalism has focused on the argument 
that what is illegitimate about nonoriginalism is that it allows for 
constitutional change (in that case, by judges) outside of Article V.264 
2. The Requisite Supermajority Support Was Achieved When 
Additional States Ratified the Fourteenth Amendment Years After 
It Became Effective.—Originalists might argue that, even without 
the coerced Southern ratifications, the requisite formal supermajority 
support for the Fourteenth Amendment was ultimately achieved when, in 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, many additional states voted to 
ratify it.265 
Recall that, as there were thirty-seven states in 1868, it was necessary 
for twenty-eight states to ratify in order for the Amendment to become 
effective. By the end of 1870, thirty-three states had ratified, but ten of 
those ratifications were coerced, and three of the noncoerced ratifying 
states had subsequently sought to rescind their ratification votes.266 Since 
that time, however, the three states that voted to rescind their ratifications 
 
Principles, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 405, 413 (2007) (“To remain faithful to the Constitution . . . , we 
must never forget it is a text we are expounding. . . . [I]t is not the underlying principles that are applied 
to present circumstances but the original meaning of the text interpreted in light of these principles.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
261 See Stein, supra note 5, at 413 (noting that Ackerman’s theory does not depend on 
supermajorities). 
262 See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 198–205 (arguing that Reconstruction went a long way 
toward effectuating a fundamental change in American constitutionalism by, to a substantial degree, 
replacing the federalism-based amending procedures of Article V with something more like a national 
plebiscite). 
263 See U.S. CONST. art. V. Akhil Amar has offered an argument sounding heavily in originalism 
for the propriety of some forms of amendment outside of Article V. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent 
of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994); Akhil 
Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1043 (1988). So far, however, originalists have not been convinced. See Monaghan, supra note 77, 
passim (refuting Amar’s arguments). 
264 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
265 See Chin & Abraham, supra note 168, at 38 (suggesting this possibility). 
266 See supra notes 143–70 and accompanying text. 
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have repealed their rescission resolutions or voted again to re-ratify: 
Oregon did so in 1973; New Jersey and Ohio did so in 2003.267 On top of 
that, four additional states have now voted to ratify the Amendment: 
Delaware, which initially rejected the Amendment in 1867, voted to ratify 
in 1901; Kentucky, which initially rejected in 1867, voted to ratify in 1976; 
Maryland, which initially rejected in 1867, voted to ratify in 1959; and 
California, which initially was deadlocked and failed to act on the 
Amendment, voted to ratify in 1959.268 Of course, that still gets us to only 
twenty-seven states, one short of the twenty-eight that were necessary for 
ratification in 1868,269 let alone the thirty-eight states that were necessary 
by the time that some of these later states acted.270 But it seems reasonable 
to conclude that the people of the thirteen states that joined the Union after 
1868 formally expressed their consent to the Fourteenth Amendment (and 
the rest of the Constitution) when they petitioned for statehood.271 If that is 
so, then forty states can be said to have voluntarily ratified the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which gets us over the constitutional supermajority 
requirement without including the forced ratifications by the Southern 
states. 
The problem with this argument, from a popular sovereignty 
standpoint, is twofold. First, although ratification over the course of a 
century or more might be sufficient to formally comply with Article V, 
which does not impose an express time limit on ratification,272 it does not 
support a claim that the Amendment actually represents the formally 
 
267 See Chin & Abraham, supra note 168, at 36. 
268 See COLLINS, supra note 90; JAMES, supra note 79, at 158, 169, 177; Chin & Abraham, supra 
note 168, at 29, 31–33. 
269 See Chin & Abraham, supra note 168, at 41. 
270 Cf. Sanford Levinson, Authorizing Constitutional Text: On the Purported Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 101, 102–07 (1994) (noting that Congress declared the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment—which was proposed in 1789, when there were only nine states—to be valid after 
the thirty-eighth state ratified it in 1992). 
271 See, e.g., Omnibus Enabling Act of 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676, 676 (Act of Congress 
establishing the process by which North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Washington were to 
achieve statehood) (providing that the proposed states must hold constitutional conventions, at which, 
among other things, the elected delegates “shall declare, on behalf of the people of said proposed States, 
that they adopt the Constitution of the United States”). See generally Eric Biber, The Price of 
Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions Imposed on States Entering the Union, 46 AM. 
J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 126–29 (2004) (outlining the process that Congress has followed in admitting new 
states). 
272 See, e.g., Congressional Pay Amendment, 16 Op. O.L.C. 85, 88 (1992) (“That the ratification of 
the Congressional Pay Amendment has stretched across more than 200 years is not relevant under the 
straightforward language of Article V. Article V contains no time limits for ratification.”); Paulsen, 
supra note 19, at 692–94. In Coleman v. Miller, the Supreme Court found this issue to be a political 
question, such that Congress can choose to propose and accept an amendment without a time limit for 
ratification. 307 U.S. 433, 452–56 (1939). 
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expressed agreement of a supermajority of the people.273 As the Supreme 
Court has noted, for “ratification [to be] the expression of the approbation 
of the people . . . it must be sufficiently contemporaneous . . . to reflect the 
will of the people in all sections at relatively the same period, which of 
course ratification scattered through a long series of years would not do.”274 
Second, the public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment was very 
different between the time of its initial proposal and the time of these later 
ratifications. When Maryland and California voted to ratify in 1959, for 
instance, they did so as a “vote of support for Brown [v. Board of 
Education].”275 Brown was, of course, a “famously nonoriginalist 
decision,”276 in which the Supreme Court refused to consider historical 
evidence of original meaning and declared that “we cannot turn the clock 
back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted.”277 California and 
Maryland’s ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in the 1950s was 
therefore “an endorsement of its current interpretation”278—an endorsement 
of its contemporary meaning, rather than its original meaning. These later 
ratifications manifestly cannot be taken to demonstrate supermajority 
support for, and agreement to be bound by, the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.279 
 
273 See House Hearings, supra note 168, at 69, 72, 81–82, 85 (testimony of Prof. Charles L. Black, 
Jr., Yale Law School) (arguing that ratification over a period of decades cannot be taken to reflect the 
sovereign will of the people because “consent given in [one year] might be very stale [a decade and a 
half later] and hardly evidence of any consensus”); Stewart Dalzell & Eric J. Beste, Is the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment 200 Years Too Late?, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 501, 521–29 (1994) (arguing that 
amendments ratified over a long period of time do not reflect the will or consent of the people); 
Paulsen, supra note 19 (“To permit ratification over a period of two centuries is to erode, if not erase, 
the ideal of overwhelming popular agreement.”). But see Paulsen, supra note 19, at 695–96 (arguing 
that, because “[p]opular sovereignty—the consent of the people to their form of government—can be 
transmitted over time,” “it is not clear why the requisite ‘consensus’ may not be measured across 
generations”). 
274 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 370–71, 375–76 (1921) (upholding the time limit for ratification 
that Congress placed upon the Eighteenth Amendment). 
275 Chin & Abraham, supra note 168, at 32–33. 
276 Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 IND. L.J. 1183, 1204 (2012); see also Michael 
J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 
81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995) (arguing that Brown cannot be squared with originalism); Michael W. 
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 949, 953–55 (1995) 
(arguing that the result in Brown is consistent with originalism, but conceding that the Court’s actual 
reasoning in Brown was profoundly and explicitly nonoriginalist). 
277 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954). 
278 Editorial, Refreshing Gesture, WASH. POST & TIMES HERALD, Apr. 7, 1959, at A16 (emphasis 
added) (“The Maryland legislators could have used this opportunity to express disapproval and 
indignation over the Supreme Court’s decision in the school desegregation cases decided under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, they made a point voting overwhelmingly for the Amendment, which 
must necessarily constitute an endorsement of its current interpretation.”). 
279 Cf. Congressional Pay Amendment, supra note 272, at 95 n.13 (“It is conceivable that the goal 
of consensus, if there is one, could be defeated where the last State to ratify harbors an entirely different 
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3. The Southern Objections to the Amendment Should Not Count 
Because the Southern States Lacked a Republican Form of 
Government.—Akhil Amar has argued that Congress was justified 
in refusing to seat the representatives from the Southern states because 
Congress legitimately found that those states, by refusing to enfranchise 
their massive African-American minorities, did not have a republican form 
of government.280 By the same token, argues Amar, Congress’s insistence 
on ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment as a condition of reentering 
the Union was justifiable because the Fourteenth Amendment was designed 
to ensure the continuing existence of republican government in the South.281 
Amar offers this argument in support of a claim that the enactment of 
the Fourteenth Amendment formally complied with the terms of 
Article V282—a question on which I take no position here.283 McGinnis and 
Rappaport, however, seek to extend Amar’s argument to address the 
question whether the Amendment “represented a national consensus.”284 
They argue that, “[i]f the Reconstruction Amendments were legal,” then 
 
intent or purpose in approving the amendment than did the first ratifying States or the proposing 
Congress.”). 
280 See AMAR, supra note 17, at 368–76; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall 
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”); id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 
(“Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own 
Members . . . .”). Of course, most Northern states did not allow free blacks to vote either. But, argues 
Amar, blacks were only a tiny percentage of the population in the North, and Congress could 
reasonably conclude that disenfranchising 2% of the male population does not offend the basic 
republican ideal of government in the way that disenfranchising 25%–50% of the male population does. 
See AMAR, supra note 17, at 374. 
281 See AMAR, supra note 17, at 376–80. 
282 See id. at 366 (arguing that, contra Ackerman, “Reconstruction Republicans plausibly acted 
within the general Article V framework, even as they repeatedly found themselves obliged to 
improvise, interpolate, and make commonsensical judgment calls to resolve many difficult legal issues 
that were arising for the first time in the mid-1860s (and that have never recurred)”). 
283 The fact that a constitutional provision is formally valid does not necessarily mean that it 
reflects the consensus views of a supermajority of the people. Cf. Harrison, supra note 8, at 458 (noting 
that the “Republicans . . . got away with something Article V probably was supposed to prevent” but 
explaining that “[t]his is no problem for a formalist”). Imagine, for instance, that Congress were to 
follow a big win for the Democratic Party in a national election by proposing a constitutional 
amendment seeking to expand and constitutionalize the welfare state. And imagine further that, after 
well over one-fourth of the states enthusiastically voted down the proposed amendment, the Democratic 
supermajority in Congress refused to seat the elected Senators and Representatives from the recalcitrant 
“red states” until those states changed their minds about ratification. If the chastised states were 
ultimately to give in and ratify the proposed amendment, that might well satisfy Article V as a formalist 
matter. See id. at 453–54. But it would be outrageous to suggest in those circumstances that the 
amendment actually garnered the consent of a supermajority of the American people. 
284 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 62, at 1727 n.83. Although McGinnis and Rappaport 
advance this argument (and the one discussed in Part III.A.4, infra) in support of their supermajoritarian 
defense of originalism, it would seem to be equally applicable to the popular sovereignty and contract 
defenses. 
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“this analysis would largely address the concerns about their consensus 
character.”285 They elaborate: 
[S]uppose, as Amar suggests, that many of the confederate states were 
properly excluded from voting because they did not have the constitutionally 
required republican form of government. Then, the amendments would have 
been legal, having passed with the requisite constitutional supermajorities. It 
is true that the consensus behind the amendments would have excluded much 
of the former Confederacy, but the Constitution would have made the 
judgment that nonrepublican states should be excluded. When a portion of the 
country is no longer republican, there is a tradeoff between requiring an 
extended consensus and limiting input to those with republican values, and the 
Constitution would have chosen republican values over a full consensus.286 
In other words, the racist Southern state governments that initially 
rejected the Fourteenth Amendment (prior to being remade at the hand of 
Congress) were not truly “republican,” insofar as they disenfranchised their 
sizable black populations. As such, the Constitution made the judgment to 
exclude those states from the national consensus that is necessary for 
constitutional amendments, perhaps because their “values” were 
constitutionally unacceptable, or perhaps because nonrepublican 
governments cannot be taken to speak for the people as a whole. 
McGinnis and Rappaport are the only originalists of whom I am aware 
who have directly addressed the ramifications of the irregularities in the 
framing of the Fourteenth Amendment for the normative defense of 
originalism. While they deserve much credit for recognizing and 
confronting the problem (albeit only in a footnote), their reasoning seems 
unconvincing. The whole theory behind the traditional normative defenses 
of originalism is that the Constitution represents the voice of the people as 
whole, not the voice of the fraction of the people that the Framers or the 
Congress considered worthy of being heard. If the Constitution indeed 
makes the judgment that people who hold certain values will not be 
counted, then that suggests that the Constitution is not actually the voice of 
the people. There may well be good, moral reasons for excluding racists (or 
monarchists, or anarchists, or what-have-you) from the process of shaping 
our higher law. But doing so is not consistent with a notion that that higher 
law is possessed of a “consensus character.”287 
Perhaps McGinnis and Rappaport’s argument is more narrowly 
focused on the nature of the excluded values. Perhaps the argument is that, 
in order to establish a genuine supermajority that truly manifests the 
collective sovereignty of the populace, it is necessary to have a certain 
degree of inclusiveness in the ratification process. The South could be 
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of republicanism (as a result of its disenfranchisement of blacks) meant that 
its elected representatives could not speak for the whole of its people in the 
process of higher lawmaking. That is to say, in order to achieve legitimate 
popular sovereignty and supermajoritarianism, it was necessary to exclude 
the racist states that disenfranchised minorities; the normative justifications 
for originalism require us to “cho[ose] republican values over a full 
consensus.”288 
But if that is the argument, then it proves too much, and it would seem 
to undercut the entire originalist enterprise. With a few exceptions, blacks 
were not represented in the ratification of the original Constitution either. 
Nor were the poor, Native Americans, or women.289 Indeed, women were 
also not able to participate in the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.290 If constitutional legitimacy depends on popular sovereignty, 
supermajoritarianism, or both, and if popular sovereignty and 
supermajoritarianism preclude disenfranchising a significant percentage of 
the population, then virtually the entire Constitution was illegitimate from 
the get-go, and there is no reason to interpret it according to its original 
meaning.291 
4. Despite Its Lack of Supermajoritarian Support, the Fourteenth 
Amendment Corrected for the Initial Exclusion of African 
Americans from the Framing of the Constitution.—McGinnis and 
Rappaport offer another argument to address the concerns with the framing 
of the Fourteenth Amendment: 
Even if one did conclude that [forcing the Fourteenth Amendment upon the 
South] was problematic . . . , following the amendment[] might still be 
justifiable under our theory as a normative matter. The amendment[] operated 
to correct a supermajoritarian failure—the original Constitution’s exclusion of 
blacks from political participation—and therefore might be justified on that 
basis. If the Judiciary enforced the amendment[] under this theory, that 
 
288 Id. 
289 See supra notes 213–15 and accompanying text. 
290 This was a point that several Northern Democrats made at the time in response to the republican 
form of government argument. See AMAR, supra note 17, at 376. 
291 On the topic of values, one might be tempted to shrug aside the concerns raised in this Article 
by arguing that, because the white Southerners were secessionists, slave owners, and racists, we ought 
to have no qualms about the fact that their views were disregarded or forcefully overridden in the 
making of the Fourteenth Amendment. That might be a perfectly viable argument for a nonoriginalist to 
make. But it will not do for an originalist who claims normative authority for originalism based on 
supermajoritarianism or popular sovereignty. If the legitimacy of the Constitution is grounded in the 
will of the people, rather than in the Constitution’s moral goodness, then our own views of morality are 
no substitute for formal actions of a supermajority of the people. Indeed, the original Constitution is 
riddled with provisions that were included only at the insistence of racist slaveholders. See HAROLD M. 
HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
1835–1875, at 89–90 (1982). Yet we still follow them. 
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enforcement would represent a judicial correction of the original exclusion of 
African-Americans.292 
McGinnis and Rappaport elaborate that the Reconstruction 
Amendments afford blacks the same rights that whites had at the time of 
the framing of the original Constitution and “provide African-Americans 
with the provisions they would have been able to obtain in 1789 if there 
had been no supermajoritarian failure and, instead, they had fully 
participated in the enactment process.”293 
This argument, too, does not seem compelling. It all but concedes the 
validity of the core nonoriginalist objection to originalism that the 
Constitution was initially flawed from a supermajoritarian and popular 
sovereignty standpoint.294 But then it goes on to suggest that that flaw has 
somehow been corrected by another amendment that was itself flawed from 
a supermajoritarian and popular sovereignty standpoint. The original 
Constitution was not actually the product of the sovereign will of a 
supermajority of the people, but that’s okay, because its shortcomings have 
been made up for by the Fourteenth Amendment, which was not the 
product of the sovereign will of a supermajority of the people either! Both 
the counterfactual nature of this argument and its assertion that two wrongs 
make a right seem hard to square with the core precepts of originalism.295 
How can we possibly know whether the Fourteenth Amendment contains 
the provisions that would have been included in the original Constitution a 
century earlier had blacks been allowed to participate in the framing? 
(Indeed, much of the Fourteenth Amendment addresses matters other than 
race, and many of the federalism-based objections to the Amendment 
ostensibly had nothing to do with race.) And, in any event, originalism 
accords primacy to the written text that was actually enacted voluntarily by 
a supermajority of the people, not to the provisions that we think would 
have been enacted had the whole of the people been able to participate in 
the framing.296 If neither the original Constitution nor the Fourteenth 
Amendment was actually ratified voluntarily by the requisite 
supermajority, then the normative case for originalism is doubly crippled. 
  
 
292 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 62, at 1727 n.83 (citation omitted). 
293 Id. at 1759. 
294 See id. at 1758 (“Supermajority rules have the virtue of creating consensus solutions, but if a 
class of voters is excluded from the process, its absence casts doubt on the existence or content of that 
consensus. . . . Moreover, the supermajoritarian process is designed to protect minorities. But it will 
have difficulty doing so if those minorities cannot participate.”). 
295 Cf. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 204 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (refusing to correct for one deviation from the original constitutional meaning with another, 
because “two wrongs do not make a right”). 
296 See supra Part III.A.1.b. 
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5. Because the Popular Sovereignty Rationale for Originalism Is 
Best Understood as Forward-Looking, Past Popular Sovereignty 
Failures Do Not Undermine It.—Some originalists have argued 
that the popular sovereignty justification for originalism should be 
understood as forward-looking, rather than backward-looking.297 That is to 
say, they argue that originalism protects the sovereignty of the people 
today, not the sovereignty of the Framers. In Whittington’s words: 
[O]riginalism secures the effectiveness of a future expression of the popular 
will. By maintaining the principle that constitutional meaning is determined 
by its authors, originalism provides the basis for future constitutional 
deliberation by the people. Present and future generations can only expect 
their own constitutional will to be effectuated if they are willing to give effect 
to prior such expressions.298 
Or, as Steven Smith puts it: 
[I]nsofar as originalism has a central and animating normative purpose, that 
purpose, it seems, is to empower people—actual human beings—to debate 
and deliberate and then adopt constitutional provisions with the confidence 
that these will mean and do pretty much what the human beings who adopt 
them understand and intend the provisions to mean and do.299 
Drawing upon this line of thought, an originalist might argue that the 
shortcomings in the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment are 
irrelevant. It is not the will and authority of nineteenth-century Americans 
that matters; it is the will and authority of present and future Americans. 
Regardless of the flaws in the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
interpreting that Amendment (and the entire Constitution) according to its 
original meaning is still normatively desirable because a commitment to 
originalism is necessary in order to assure present and future generations 
that their will to impose higher law will be respected. 
But forward-looking popular sovereignty can dictate only that we must 
follow the original meaning of constitutional provisions that were the 
product of genuine supermajoritarianism.300 Why would it reassure the 
people of today of their capacity for entrenched higher lawmaking for 
judges to enforce the original meaning of a provision that was not the 
product of the sovereign will of the people of the past? Indeed, this 
 
297 See supra notes 49–54 and accompanying text. 
298 WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 156; see also id. at 111 (“[O]riginalism . . . preserves the 
possibility of similar higher-order decision making by the present and future generations of citizenry.”). 
299 Steven D. Smith, Reply to Koppelman: Originalism and the (Merely) Human Constitution, 
27 CONST. COMMENT. 189, 192 (2010) (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted). 
300 Cf. Stein, supra note 5, at 419 (noting that the forward-looking popular sovereignty argument 
would only commit the people today to an originalist interpretation of provisions that were “enacted 
under democratically legitimate procedures”). 
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argument can be flipped on its head. Forward-looking popular sovereignty 
may actually supply a reason not to employ originalism in interpreting the 
Fourteenth Amendment. By not enforcing the desires of the Republicans 
who crammed the Fourteenth Amendment down the throats of the South, 
we would reassure present and future generations that their collective will 
to impose (or not to impose) higher law will never be overridden (either 
contemporaneously or in the future) through coercion or brute force, but 
rather only through genuine acts of the collective will of the whole of the 
people. 
6. The Fourteenth Amendment Was a Peace Treaty, and Even 
Coerced Peace Treaties Are Legally Binding.—It is sometimes 
remarked that the “Fourteenth Amendment was a major part of a peace 
treaty allowing for Southern states to be readmitted to the Union after the 
Civil War.”301 This observation could provide an alternative basis for the 
legitimacy of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even if the Amendment was 
militarily forced upon the South by the triumphant Northern army—and 
thus was not the product of supermajoritarian popular sovereignty302—the 
fact remains that, under international law, “[c]oerced peace treaties are 
binding.”303 
In other words, an originalist might argue that, while the rest of the 
Constitution owes its legitimacy to the fact that it is the product of the 
sovereign will of a supermajority of the people, the Fourteenth Amendment 
has a different source of legitimacy: it reflects the terms of peace lawfully 
imposed upon the defeated South by the victorious North.304 These two 
sources of legitimacy are nearly polar opposites—one is grounded in 
 
301 Curtis, supra note 233, at 1003; see also NELSON, supra note 112, at 110–11 (“The Fourteenth 
Amendment was understood less as a legal instrument to be elaborated in the courts than as a peace 
treaty to be administered by Congress in order to secure the fruits of the North’s victory in the Civil 
War.”); WAGER SWAYNE, THE ORDINANCE OF 1787 AND THE WAR OF 1861, at 4 (New York, C.G. 
Burgoyne 1892) (declaring that the “fruits of our war are gathered and preserved” in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which was “adopted soon after the war, and with the express intention to make its results 
secure”); Mazzone, supra note 225, at 1805–06 (“[M]uch like the imposition of a constitution on 
occupied Japan in 1946 by the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers, the Reconstruction 
Amendments were imposed by the northern victors on the defeated southern states.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
302 Whittington emphasizes that, under principles of popular sovereignty, the “majority cannot 
simply impose its will on the minority through strength,” and the “process of constitutional formation 
cannot be guided by the slogan ‘to the victor go the spoils.’” WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 147. 
303 Harrison, supra note 8, at 457. Historically, “international law disregarded the effect of coercion 
in the conclusion of peace treaties.” Albert J. Esgain, The Position of the United States and the Soviet 
Union on Treaty Law and Treaty Negotiations, 46 MIL. L. REV. 31, 32 n.3 (1969) (citing 1 L. 
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 891–92 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955)). “The use of force in 
their effectuation does not derogate from the legislative character and binding force of a peace treaty.” 
Id. (citing J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 245 (5th ed. 1955)). 
304 Cf. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 390 (1947) (declaring that “the fundamental issues over the 
extent of federal supremacy had been resolved by war”). 
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consent, the other in force. But, the argument would go, they are equally 
valid. 
Perhaps. But even so, this argument cannot get originalists as far as 
they need to go. The notion that the Fourteenth Amendment is a peace 
treaty might be a reason to treat it as legitimate, but it is not a reason to 
require that it be interpreted according to its original meaning. The 
traditional argument for originalism is that the Constitution must be 
interpreted according to its original meaning because its legitimacy is 
based on the consent of the people.305 If the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
legitimacy is based on something other than the consent of the people, then 
the argument for its originalist interpretation dissolves. In general, 
international law does not demand strict originalism in treaty 
interpretation.306 And even those who insist that treaties be interpreted 
according to their original meaning do so based on principles of mutual 
consent that mirror the traditional normative defenses of originalism—that, 
in order to effectuate the shared will of the party states, courts should seek 
the “original shared understanding of the contracting parties.”307 For the 
same reasons that the Fourteenth Amendment does not represent the 
sovereign will of the people, it also does not represent the mutual consent 
of either the ratifying people or the ratifying states. What normative 
justification is there for binding today’s Southerners (who bear no 
responsibility for the Civil War) to the potentially vindictive intentions or 
understandings of the people who defeated their ancestors on the battlefield 
a century and a half ago?308 And, once we take away the pretense of mutual 
consent of the Framers, why should the fact that the North was empowered 
to dictate the terms of the Confederate surrender in the 1860s mean that we 
all must be bound today by the outdated, and even-at-the-time highly 
controversial, nineteenth-century notions of liberty and equality that were 
held by the prevailing Unionists, rather than by our own evolving 
understanding of the lofty freedoms that are guaranteed by the abstract 
terms of the Fourteenth Amendment?309 
 
305 See supra Part I. 
306 See Dinah Shelton, The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe, 13 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 95, 125 (2003) (noting that “generally accepted principles of international law” and the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which “is the primary source in international law for 
interpreting a treaty,” place a “teleological emphasis on the object and purpose of a treaty,” which 
“allows a dynamic or evolving interpretation that can move a treaty away from the original intent of its 
drafters” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
307 Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
308 Cf. COLLINS, supra note 90, at 8 (describing the initial case for the Fourteenth Amendment as 
“an appeal to fanaticism, fear, and revenge” in the North). 
309 Cf. Jordan J. Paust, The History, Nature, and Reach of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 16 FLA. J. 
INT’L L. 249, 260 n.26 (2004) (“Since the Founding, it has been understood that the meaning of . . . 
treaties can be dynamic.”); Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International 
Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 811, 832 
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7. The Southern States Need Not Be Included in the Article V 
Denominator.—Finally, originalists might argue that the Southern 
states, having voluntarily sought to secede from the Union, effectively 
removed themselves from the denominator in the Article V ratification 
equation. Thus, the necessary supermajority support was obtained in 1867, 
as soon as the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified by three-fourths of the 
loyalist states. On this theory, the subsequent ratifications by the Southern 
states “were a pledge of loyalty, not a constitutional necessity.”310 
It is difficult to see how this argument could establish the 
Amendment’s popular sovereignty bona fides. Indeed, it struggles even as a 
means of establishing the Amendment’s formal compliance with 
Article V.311 
Recall that the North’s entire theory of the war had been that the South 
had never legally seceded at all312—that the war had been fought for the 
purpose of “preserv[ing] the Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights 
of the several States unimpaired.”313 It is thus difficult to turn around and 
assert that the Southern states, having seceded, did not count as “States” for 
purposes of amending the Constitution.314 Not surprisingly, then, the 
Republican majority in Congress never endorsed this theory, and neither 
Congress nor the Secretary of State treated the Fourteenth Amendment as 
effective until it had been ratified by three-fourths of all of the states.315 
Indeed, the Southern states had already been included in the 
denominator for the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment.316 That had 
been an intentional choice, designed to establish that that Amendment was 
promulgated, in President Johnson’s words, “in the name of the whole 
people.”317 
There is no other way to establish that proposition. One cannot 
demonstrate that a constitutional amendment reflects a supermajoritarian 
consensus among the people simply by excluding from the equation the 
people of the states that rejected it. 
 
(2005) (“[I]t is well-known that treaties are to be construed also in light of . . . subsequent practice, and 
developments and evolved meanings in customary international law.”). 
310 Harrison, supra note 8, at 413 (recounting, but not endorsing, this theory). 
311 See id. at 420 (finding the argument “ultimately unpersuasive”); see also Texas v. White, 74 
U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725–26 (1868) (declaring that the Confederate States remained states for 
constitutional purposes); id. at 728 (explaining that, as such, the Thirteenth Amendment did not become 
effective until ratified by three-fourths of all of the states, North and South). 
312 See, e.g., 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 113–14. 
313 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 223 (1861). 
314 See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 113–14. 
315 See id. 
316 See id. at 103. 
317 Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 4, 1865), in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1895, at 358 (James D. Richardson ed., 1898); see also 2 
ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 150–55 (discussing the issue). 
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B. Coming to Terms with the History 
If none of the preceding counterarguments succeeds, then it seems that 
originalists will have to come to terms with the fact that the normative case 
for originalism is inapplicable to the Fourteenth Amendment. They will 
then be presented with several options. 
1. Refuse to Give Legal Effect to the Fourteenth  
Amendment.—Originalists have sometimes suggested that, where 
there was disagreement among the framing generation about the meaning 
or reach of a constitutional provision, judges should interpret that provision 
to enact only those propositions that garnered the necessary 
supermajoritarian support.318 It would seem to follow that, where there was 
no consensually expressed supermajority support for constitutionalizing 
any proposition potentially embodied in a proposed amendment—as was 
the case with the Fourteenth Amendment—the courts should decline to 
enforce that amendment altogether.319 
That reasoning makes sense. But it is a nonstarter. It seems 
vanishingly unlikely that any originalist would be willing to stick to those 
guns here. Doing so would be radically destabilizing to an unprecedented 
degree and would invalidate a huge range of cases—from incorporation of 
the Bill of Rights against the states to Brown v. Board of Education—that 
no constitutional theory can realistically reject. Originalism is currently 
enjoying an unprecedented surge in popularity.320 It is not about to commit 
suicide now.321 
 
318 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 96–97; Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original 
Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 
245–51 (1988); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. 
COMMENT. 47, 64 (2006) (noting but not endorsing the possibility that “one could say that the 
intentions of a majority of ratifiers represents constitutional meaning because the participants in the 
ratification process agreed—i.e., intended—that the majority’s intentions would represent the intentions 
of the whole group”); Maltz, supra note 12, at 802 (“The relevant intention must be the narrowest of 
any necessary members of the coalition that approves the language. The Constitution requires a full 
two-thirds of the voting members of each house to support any proposed change. If the critical issue is 
the idea embodied in the language, then two-thirds must endorse the idea as well. If fewer than two-
thirds believe that they are endorsing an idea, that idea has not gained the constitutionally required 
majority.”). 
319 Cf. WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 96–97 (suggesting that, if a supermajority of the relevant 
Framers did not in fact agree on any core content of a constitutional provision, then that provision has 
no legal meaning); Kay, supra note 318, at 248–50 (same). 
320 See Rosenthal, supra note 276, at 1183–86. 
321 “No constitutional theory is taken seriously unless it can accommodate the result in Brown.” 
Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 488 (2005). Even 
leading originalists have recognized this fact. See, e.g., BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 
25, at 77 (“Brown has become the high ground of constitutional theory. Theorists of all persuasions 
seek to capture it, because any theory that seeks acceptance must, as a matter of psychological fact, if 
not of logical necessity, account for the result in Brown.”); McConnell, supra note 276, at 952 (“The 
supposed inconsistency between Brown and the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment has 
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2. Enforce the Original Meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Anyway.—Addressing the controversy over whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment was lawfully ratified, Bryan Wildenthal has opined 
that: 
[A]t some point, we simply have to decide whether an amendment is to be 
honored as written. Conceding that Congress broke some eggs to make the 
Fourteenth Amendment omelette, it is part of the Constitution. Unless one 
rejects it altogether as an illegitimate usurpation, it should be enforced with 
full regard for how it was understood by those who wrote it.322 
Originalists who generally rely on the traditional normative defenses 
could employ the same thinking in response to the concerns raised in this 
Article. Conceding that the Fourteenth Amendment was not a reflection of 
the sovereign will of a supermajority of the people, it is nonetheless part of 
the Constitution now. (Indeed, many originalists believe that its proposal 
and ratification technically complied with Article V.)323 Unless we want to 
reject it as an illegitimate usurpation, we should enforce it according to its 
original meaning. 
But that would just gloss over the issue. Why should we insist on 
following its original meaning if it was not the product of the sovereign 
will of a supermajority of the people? If the reason why originalists insist 
on following original meaning does not apply to the Fourteenth 
Amendment, then originalism gives us no reason to be bound by that 
Amendment’s original meaning, even if we are bound by the original 
meaning of the rest of the Constitution. With nothing to counterbalance 
them, the numerous and potent normative arguments in favor of 
nonoriginalism324 would seem to carry the day. 
3. Abandon the Normative Defense of Originalism.—A final option 
for originalists would be simply to abandon the common normative 
defenses of originalism altogether—not just for the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but for the entire Constitution. Those defenses have already 
been substantially undercut by incisive criticism.325 Perhaps this additional, 
and potentially devastating, blow will lead originalists to forsake them 
completely. 
 
assumed enormous importance in modern debate over constitutional theory. Such is the moral authority 
of Brown that if any particular theory does not produce the conclusion that Brown was correctly 
decided, the theory is seriously discredited.”). 
322 Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original Understanding of 
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866–67, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1509, 1612 (2007). 
323 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 17, at 366; Harrison, supra note 8, at 457–60. 
324 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 23–26 (4th 
ed. 2011); Farber, supra note 24, at 1087–100. 
325 See supra notes 210–17 and accompanying text. 
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Originalists might seek instead to defend originalism on a different 
normative ground—one that is not premised on the consent of the people.326 
To that end, they could try to fall back on the other common normative 
defense of originalism: that it is preferable to the alternatives because it 
does a better job of constraining judges.327 But that would not be a retreat to 
safe ground, as this defense is ultimately premised on notions of popular 
sovereignty as well. If the goal is simply to constrain judges, there are 
certainly better ways to do so than requiring them to follow the original 
meaning.328 We could, for instance, require them to be strictly bound by the 
result of a coin flip,329 or to defer absolutely to the decisions of other 
government institutions.330 The only reason why someone committed to 
judicial constraint would insist on original meaning as the means of 
constraint, rather than coin flips, or precedent,331 or Thayerian deference,332 
 
326 See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 211 (seeking to defend a particular version of originalism on 
normative grounds that focuses on libertarian legitimacy, rather than popular sovereignty). 
327 See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality of Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 283, 291 (1996) (“The criteria of originalism constrain all the participants in the game—
including, most especially, the referees.”); Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis: 
Two Case Studies of Consistency and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making, 33 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 217, 237 (2010) (arguing that “originalism promises to constrain constitutional 
interpretation”); Scalia, supra note 29, at 863 (arguing that originalism is “less likely to aggravate the 
most significant weakness of the system of judicial review”—that is, “that the judges will mistake their 
own predilections for the law”); Whittington, supra note 1, at 602 (noting that the “primary 
commitment” of originalism initially “was to judicial restraint” and that “[o]riginalist methods of 
constitutional interpretation were understood as a means to that end”—as a “mechanism to redirect 
judges from essentially subjective consideration of morality to objective consideration of legal 
meaning”). 
328 But see Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 823, 826 (1986) (“The only way in which the Constitution can constrain judges is if the judges 
interpret the document’s words according to the intentions of those who drafted, proposed, and ratified 
its provisions and its various amendments.”). 
329 See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 53 
(2000) (“Maximal judicial constraint is not the goal; a mandatory coin flip in every litigated case might 
constrain the judiciary, but to what end?”); Adam M. Samaha, Low Stakes and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 305, 327 n.59 (2010) (“An even worse version of the constraint 
argument is that the need for constraint indicates that judges ought to adopt a particular interpretive 
method, such as some version of originalism. Every method of interpretation and decision making 
presents constraints. A need for judicial constraint is not an especially productive way of choosing 
among methods.” (citing ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 156 n.31 (2d ed. 
2005) as “noting that judges could objectively constrain themselves by flipping coins”)). 
330 See Adam M. Samaha, Originalism’s Expiration Date, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1295, 1347 (2008) 
(noting that near-absolute deference is at least as constraining as originalism). 
331 Cf. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 925–
28 (1996) (arguing that a commitment to common law judicial decisionmaking would be more 
constraining than originalism). 
332 See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 
7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893) (arguing that courts should strike down a statute only if its 
unconstitutionality is “so clear that it is not open to rational question”). 
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or representation reinforcement,333 or any of a thousand other potentially 
more constraining options, is that originalism can be said to prevent judges 
from interfering with democracy except where necessary to vindicate the 
will of the people themselves334—the very notion of popular sovereignty 
that cannot fairly be applied to the Fourteenth Amendment.335 
As such, originalists might choose instead to simply stop defending 
originalism on normative grounds altogether. To a substantial degree, this 
is already happening. In recent years, academic originalists have begun, in 
small but increasing numbers, to treat originalism as a purely interpretive, 
rather than normative, theory.336 These theorists insist that “the merit of 
originalism as a . . . theory of interpretation does not depend on social 
contract theory or any other theory of political legitimacy. One can be a 
strict interpretative originalist and forcefully deny that the Constitution has 
any political legitimacy.”337 Boiled down to its essence, their argument is 
that all legal texts—indeed all texts of all sorts—should be understood 
according to their original semantic meaning, regardless of the manner in 
which they were drafted or adopted.338 They view originalism as a theory of 
textual meaning, not a theory of constitutional or judicial legitimacy. 
Perhaps the arguments in this Article will encourage additional 
originalists to follow suit. After all, originalists who eschew the normative 
defense of originalism—who ground their theory in notions of linguistic 
meaning rather than collective consent—will not be fazed by this Article. 
The semantic meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is not affected by the 
way in which it was forced upon the South. 
 
333 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) 
(arguing that courts should strike down statutes only when there has been a breakdown in the 
democratic process). 
334 Cf. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 25, at 163–64 (“In . . . its vindication of 
democracy against unprincipled judicial activism, the philosophy of original understanding does better 
by far than any other theory of constitutional adjudication can.” (emphasis added)); Michael W. 
McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into Law, 98 YALE 
L.J. 1501, 1525 (1989) (book review) (“The appeal of originalism is that the moral principles so applied 
will be the foundational principles of the American Republic . . . and not the political-moral principles 
of whomever happens to occupy the judicial office.”). 
335 In any event, originalists have recently tended to back away from this defense of originalism. 
See Whittington, supra note 1, at 608–09 (explaining that, in recent originalist writing, “there seems to 
be less emphasis on the capacity of originalism to limit the discretion of the judge”); Thomas B. Colby, 
The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 750–51 (2011). And for good reason. See id. 
passim (arguing that recent theoretical advances in originalism have necessarily extinguished any 
plausible claim that originalism can meaningfully constrain judges). 
336 See Colby, supra note 335, at 735–36 (discussing this development in originalist theory). 
337 Lawson, supra note 211, at 1825. For a sophisticated discussion of this issue, see Solum, supra 
note 12, at 28–30, 126–63. 
338 See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Misunderstood Relationship Between Originalism and 
Popular Sovereignty, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 485, 486 (2008). 
107:1627 (2013) Originalism and Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment 
1687 
This budding movement away from popular sovereignty has been 
highly controversial in originalist circles. Many leading originalists deny 
the wisdom, and even the possibility, of separating normative theories of 
originalism from interpretive ones. Whittington, for instance, insists that it 
“is the role of the constitutional theorist not only to grapple with the full 
meaning of the Constitution but also to examine the nature of 
constitutionalism more generally and the normative basis for any particular 
expression of it.”339 And McConnell claims that “[w]e cannot address the 
question of how to interpret the Constitution for the purpose of resolving 
present-day disputes without first understanding why we should consult the 
decisions of persons long dead for that purpose.”340 McConnell argues that 
“it turns out that our answer to the ‘why’ question has implications for the 
‘how’ question. We can determine the method to interpret the Constitution 
only if we are first clear about why the Constitution is authoritative.”341 
Indeed, some originalists have argued that an understanding of 
constitutional legitimacy as deriving from popular sovereignty is essential 
to the very notion of originalism—that “originalism demands popular 
sovereignty as a matter of historical and interpretative accuracy.”342 
It is not my purpose here to referee this intramural dispute among 
originalists. I will only observe that there would be a substantial cost to 
choosing this path. The primary normative defenses of originalism are 
central to originalism’s popular appeal. They provide an easily 
understandable and intuitively powerful reason to insist on following the 
original meaning. The social contract model “is the political theory the man 
in the street supplies when he appeals to the Constitution.”343 As one 
scholar has put it, the “notion of popular sovereignty is a prototypically and 
traditionally American way of thinking about government and society, a 
factor which undoubtedly plays no small part in originalism’s persistence 
and appeal, even in the face of strong criticism.”344 Take away the 
normative defenses of originalism—turn it into a dry and technical theory 
of semantic textual interpretation instead—and you cede the high ground 
and lose the talking points that appeal to the masses.345 Semantic, linguistic 
theory is a thin reed upon which to place the weight of a demand to the 
 
339 WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 111. 
340 McConnell, supra note 2, at 1128. 
341 Id. 
342 Alicea, supra note 21, at 52. 
343 Easterbrook, supra note 58. 
344 James A. Gardner, The Positivist Foundations of Originalism: An Account and Critique, 
71 B.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1991). 
345 Cf. Colby, supra note 335, at 744–64, 776–78 (arguing that the theoretical advances of the New 
Originalism have come at a substantial cost to the traditional nature, potential benefits, and popular 
appeal of originalism—particularly its claim to impose judicial constraint). 
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American people that they must be constrained by the potentially stunted 
conceptions of liberty and equality that prevailed a century or two ago.346 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought to make a simple but important point: the 
traditional normative case for originalism does not hold water when applied 
to the Fourteenth Amendment—the constitutional provision that underlies 
most controversial cases. Because the usual reasons to insist on originalism 
do not apply to the Fourteenth Amendment, it becomes much more difficult 
to explain why, in interpreting that Amendment’s open-ended guarantees of 
freedom in the twenty-first century, we must remain bound by outmoded 
nineteenth-century conceptions of “equal protection,” “liberty,” “due 
process of law” and the like. This difficulty poses a serious challenge to 
originalism—a challenge that calls for an answer. 
 
 
346 The best way to sell this argument would be to appeal to the fact that Article VI binds judges by 
an oath to support the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. Thus, if, as a matter of linguistic 
necessity, the only true meaning of the Constitution is its original meaning, then judges who practice 
nonoriginalism violate their oath of office. See Colby, supra note 335, at 740 (noting this argument). 
Still, even so dressed up, this argument depends entirely on the underlying claim of semantic theory—
that the true “meaning” of a document is necessarily its original meaning—again, a thin reed upon 
which to base the originalist case to the public. 
